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CHAPTER IV

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CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INDIA'S  
FOREIGN POLICY

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India-Pakistan relations occupy a central place in India's foreign policy. From the beginning these relations were not very cordial. A period of hostility was an 'invitable' consequence' of the way in which Pakistan came to birth. "India and Pakistan have been in a State of undeclared war, with varying degrees of intensity, throughout their brief history as independent States"<sup>1</sup>.

It would be an over-simplification to say that India never makes an about turn in its attitudes, but it would be safe to say that nitherto Indian history and its movements have not developed along such lines. Therefore, at any given movement of time in India the conditioning of a very long past is a powerful factor in the formulation of her foreign policy, more powerful perhaps than in most other countries. The fact that in his first official broadcast to the Indian people, on September 7th, 1946, a few days after taking office as Vice-President of Executive Council of the Viceroy of India, "Nehru, who at that time had no official experience in foreign affairs, not even in a

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1. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography,  
London, 1959, p.576.

parliamentary opposition party; stated in remarkably full outline the foreign policy which he was to implement for the next seventeen and one half years<sup>2</sup>. Nehru pointed out that India's primary aims as follows.

At a Press Conference held on 26th September, 1946, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru elaborated the aims which essentially remained those of India till 1957. These aims primarily were:-

- i) Promotion of international peace,
- ii) Co-operation with United Nations,
- iii) Friendship with all Nations, more particularly with neighbouring countries,
- iv) Membership of the commonwealth of nations,
- v) Freedom of dependent people, and;
- vi) Opposition to racial discrimination.<sup>3</sup>

Neither in Nehru's broadcast from New Delhi on 7th September, 1946, nor at the subsequent press conferences

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- 2. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946, April 1961, New Delhi, Government of India, 1961, pp.1-3.
  - 3. See The Indian Annual Register, July-December, 1946, Vol.II, Calcutta, pp.251-58, Also see Broadcast from New Delhi, September 7, 1946 in Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Selected speeches, September 1946, April, 1961. The Publication Division, Government of India, 1971, pp.1-4.

was there any reference to the promotion of India's national interest as an objective of foreign policy. Nehru many a times subordinated national interest to international interest. Why was this not mentioned ? I believe it was taken for granted. In Nehru's own words:

"Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare to anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country"<sup>4</sup>.

To Pakistan's holding on the two-nation theory which had been propagated by the Muslim league in undivided India. Partition was advocated and accepted by the Pakistani leaders on the basis of the theory that the Hindus and Muslims were two nations and should, therefore, have separate homelands. The Indian leaders, while accepting

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4. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative)  
December 1947, Vol.II, pp.1262-63.

partition, never approved this theory. They accepted partition on the basis of some-kind of territorial self-determination. In this connection, Nehru points,

"that it was quite impossible to divide it (India) on the basis of separating religious groups on one side or the other. They overlapped, so it was clearly understood that those communities which became the minority communities on this side or that must have the fullest protection and fullest security of their lives; otherwise the whole structure which we had build up collapsed"<sup>5</sup>.

In this view, a division of the Indian Sub-continent on the basis of the religion would be impossible if it is realized that India has the largest Muslim population in any State except Pakistan and Indonesia. The partition of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan gave rise to a number of disputes, political, economic and technical- but all surcharged with intense \ emotion. One consequence of the reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy, was the increasing concern of New Delhi for India's security.

The partition of India has been also a major factor in influencing India's foreign policy. Nehru never approved

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5. Speech in Parliament, March 17, 1950, Parliamentary Debates, Par. 5.2, III, 3.50/821, p.1700.

nor accepted partition on the basis of caste and religion. He was much perturbed because of the growing importance of caste in Indian politics.

Pakistan's military alignment with the Western bloc had, in his view, brought the cold war to India's borders and was thus a threat to its territorial integrity. It was generally assumed that the two sister dominations would co-operate with each other and draw up a joint programme for their relations with the outside world. But this did not materialise. Nehru never compromised his position on non-aligned foreign policy, though Pakistan during the early period of independence joined various treaties and welcomed neuclear aid from various sources, claiming treats from the Indian sub-continent. Each of them chartered out its own independent course of action in the international field.

In a message to the Press on 15th August, 1947, Prime Minister Nehru said, " I want to say to all the nations of the world, including our neighbour country, that we stand for peace and friendship with them"<sup>6</sup>. In the course

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6. Nawaharlal Nehru, Independence & After: A collection of the more important speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949, Delhi, 1949, p.14.

of a broadcast, the Governor General of Pakistan, M.A. Jinnah said, "we want to live peacefully and maintain cordial friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large"<sup>7</sup>. In spite of these declarations the story of India-Pakistan relations became 'one of discord-sometimes latent some times manifest, but discord all the same."<sup>8</sup>

Behind this formulation were Nehru's understanding of the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations and his vision of a distant but inevitable future. In a speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs in March, 1949, he said, " In regard to Pakistan the position has been a very peculiar one owing to the way Pakistan was formed and India was divided. And there have not only been all the upset of that you know but something much deeper, and that is a complete emotional upset of all the people in India and Pakistan because of this. It is a very difficult thing to deal with, a psychological thing, which cannot be dealt with superficially... There is no doubt at all in my mind

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7. Documents and speeches of British Commonwealth Affairs, compiled by Mansergh, London, 1953, Vol.2, p.702.
8. Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations 1947-55, Amsterdam, 1958, p.34.

that is inevitable for India and Pakistan to have close relations, very close relations, sometime or other in the future. I cannot state when this will take place, but situated as we are, with all our past we cannot be just indifferent neighbours. We can be either rather hostile to each other or very friendly with each other. Ultimately we can only be really very friendly, whatever period of hostility may intervene in between because our interests are so closely interlinked."<sup>9</sup> Nehru had been very clear in his approach. From this, his foresight of Indo-Pakistan relations can be interpreted. He had some basic convictions and in this context it is clear.

#### Compulsions on Indian Policy:

Speaking in Parliament on 7th August, 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru enunciated a principle for dealing with a neighbour like Pakistan. "It is no good having an approach which is neither here nor there. I can understand - though I disapprove of it - the attitude of defiance and war. I can also understand the friendly approach but I do not understand a middle course which does not have the advantages

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9. Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches, September 1946, May, 1949, Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Publications Division, 1958, Edn.2, pp.252-253.



of either. It is a weak man's approach. You neither get the benefits of a friendly approach nor those of the approach of defiance... Therefore, we have nothing to do with a middle approach"<sup>10</sup>.

The compulsions which inevitably pulled Indian policy towards a middle course can be grouped under three heads :

- i) the inner compulsions, so to say of the policy making elite,
- ii) the domestic compulsions, and;
- iii) the international compulsions."<sup>11</sup>

In discussing the making of any policy, it is necessary to ask: What was the mental attitude of the policy-makers towards the object of their policy ? This is not necessarily the most important element which determines policies except in cases where beliefs images, and ideas are part of an ideology or a total view of life. In India the policy makers were largely pragmatists. It is necessary here to deal with one of the continuing myth about Indian attitudes

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- 10. Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches 1949-53, Delhi, 1954,  
Government of India, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting  
Publications Division, p.296.
- 11. India's Policy towards Pakistan, by Sisir Gupta,  
International Studies, Quarterly, Journal of the  
Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi,  
Asia Publishing House, Vol.8, Nos.1-2, p.34.

to the partition. The occasional declaratory statements made by the leaders of the Indian National Congress during 1940-46. On the essential unity of India have often been cited by publicists in Pakistan as evidence of Indian leaders mental reservations in accepting the partition, the mention of the ultimate goal of Indian unity in the "congress resolution of June 1947 accepting the Mountbatten Plan, has also been quoted as evidence of Indian leaders not being reconciled to the Partition"<sup>12</sup>.

The most significant point in this regards was the public controversy between "Abul Kalam Azad on one hand and Govind Ballabh Pant and Vallabhai Patel on the other regarding the relative merits of the plans presented by the Cabinet Mission and Lord Louis Mountbatten"<sup>13</sup>. To hard-headed congress leaders like Nehru and Patel, the retention of a strong centralized authority in a divided India was an infinitely better choice than the only other

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12. For an analysis of some of these factors by a distinguished Western Historian , see Nicholas Mansergh 'The Partition of India Retrospect', International Journal, (Toronto), Vol.21, pp.1-19.
13. Indian Annual Register (Calcutta), January-June, 1947, pp.129-30. Also see Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative (Bombay, 1959), pp.196-197, 226.

that was available: a loose Indian Confederation in which the Muslim League and the princes together would be able to prevent any effort by the Congress to mould in its own way the country's domestic and foreign policies. It is worthwhile in this connection to quote from two of the early speeches of the two men who made Indian policies: although in both of the statements, made with in the first few months after freedom, the goal of reunion is mentioned as a vague and distant possibility, the operative parts of both were meant to reassure Pakistan and allay any fears about India that might have existed there. Patel said at Rajkot on 12th November, 1947:

" I bear Pakistan no ill-will, I wish them Godspeed. Let them only leave us alone, to pursue, our own salvation and stop meddling with our affairs in places like far - off Tripura. We shall then settle down to our respective destiny. May be, after we have become prosperous. They themselves will awaken to the need for reunion in the interest of both. It is neither our business nor our interest to force a reunion. We only wish to be left alone..."<sup>14</sup>.

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14. Indian Annual Register (Calcutta), January-June, 1947, pp.129-30. Also see Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative (Bombay, 1959), pp.196-7, 226.

Nehru declared at the Aligarh Muslim University on  
24th January, 1948:

"If we had wanted <sup>to</sup> break Pakistan why did we agree  
to the partition ? It was easier to prevent it then  
than to try to do so now after all that has happened.  
There is not going back in history. As a matter of  
fact, it is to India's advantage that Pakistan should  
be secure and prosperous state with which we can  
develop close and friendly relations. If today, by  
any chance, I were offered the reunion of India and  
Pakistan, I would decline it for obvious reasons.  
I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan's great  
problems. I have enough of my own. Any closer associa-  
tion must come out of a normal process and in a  
friendly way which does not end Pakistan as a State,  
but makes it an equal part of a larger union with  
which several countries might be associated"<sup>15</sup>.

A perusal of Nehru's writings on the Muslim League,  
both in an 'Autobiography' and 'The Discovery of India,'  
would reveal an image of the organization and its leaders

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15. Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches September 1946, May 1949,  
Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Information  
and Broadcasting, Publications Division, 1958, Edn.2,  
p.338.

could not have created respect for it. As early as April 1940, a month after the Lahore Resolution was passed by the League demanding the Sovereign States in India based on the theory of two nations. Nehru had said, "Though he could not regard the Hindus and the Muslims as two nations, he did regard those who talked in this vein as belonging to a different nation with whom he could not live together"<sup>16</sup>.

The course that Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies took after freedom further depended this feeling: "the increasing dependence on an collaboration with the west, the eagerness to befriend all India's adversaries,"<sup>17</sup> The emphasis on religion in the State ideology of Pakistan, the gradual collapse of democracy in Pakistan, the rise of military regime in its place, the denial of equal rights to the minorities in the constitution, and the track devotion to the cause of limiting and curbing India - " all appeared

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16. The Leader (Allahabad), 6th April, 1940.

17. Nehru said in a reference to Pakistan's support to Portugal on Goa on 2nd September, 1957. "It does not surprise me that in the context of world events Pakistan and Portugal are knit together and are close friends... we did not expect Pakistan to stand out as a crusader of anti-colonialism. They could well have remained silent over the issue but they have gone out of their way to support Portuguese domination in Goa... It is extraordinary that simply because of their hatred of India they should descend to such levels." Nehru, n.3. pp. 72-73.

as the continuation of a long story which had begun to unfold ~~itself~~ in the early decades of this century"<sup>18</sup>.

The major international compulsion which Indian policy towards Pakistan had to take note of was, not only that Pakistan was under written by powerful international forces but also that it was perhaps historically conceived to perform one vital international role - curbing and limiting the new nations of 350 millions which had emerged on the world scene in August 1947.

Apart from the fact that to 'India transfer of power' was not the end of a phase in a longer struggle against the Imperial Power, The realities were so stark and the task of consolidating freedom was so great that such a course of action would have perhaps appeared adventurous to younger and more radical leaders as well. "What is more, the sympathy and tacit support of Britain was needed to resolve problems like that of the Princes and for the emotional rehabilitation of India's top civil servants and army officers in the new

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18. Of Nehru's statement: Pakistan... is developing today as an Islamic, feudal State. It is backward, reactionary, economically weak, administratively disrupted. The army is led by British officers. If they are left there would be no Pakistani Army... Pakistan is a media evil state with an impossible theoretic concept. It should never have been created and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind this foolish idea of Jinnah' Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton, N.J., 1954), pp.128-130.

India"<sup>19</sup>. Immediate post-partition problems apart, the foreign policy of India was largely directed towards gaining the maximum possible independence of action without losing all friendship and sympathy in the West. Learning to live with a hostile Pakistan was an essential condition for the pursuit of this two fold goal. By giving up the former goal (which found expression in non-alignment) India might have bargained with the West to get the problem of Pakistan out of the way.

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19. After almost two decades, it is likely to be forgotten that relations with Great Britain were one of the most difficult problems that India faced in the early years. The following extract from a statement of Patel dated 29th June, 1948, would illustrate the irritation that, it caused among India's nationalist leaders:

"I should like, therefore, to tell His Majesty's Government that if they wish India to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain they must see that India is no way subjected to malicious and venomous attacks of this kind and that British statements and others learn to speak of this country in terms of friendship and goodwill. Owing to years of deepseated prejudice and owing to ignorance, it may be difficult for some of them to do so but if future disasters are to be avoided, it has got to be done... No dispassionate student of recent Indian History can fail to be convinced that the partition of the country and the attendant disasters were brought about by the disruptive activities of the group of which Mr. Churchill was the inspiration and spokesman", Patel, n.15, pp.115-16.

"India could have pursued a more vigorous anti-Pakistani policy; but it would have meant not only an Indian decision to do without vital Western assistance and sympathy but also a decision to have itself confronted by Western power, which had formally announced its presence across the border shortly after India began to show signs of defiance"<sup>20</sup>. The Pakistani American Alliance SEATO (March, 1957) and the Baghdad Pact (later the CENTO) were realities which had to be taken in the account. In late 1965, Krishna Menon who had first had knowledge in most of these matters, said "we have to recognise that our defence against Pakistan is not only against her armies but against pressures from her allies."<sup>21</sup>

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20. The alliance with the United States early in 1954 formalized a situation which had existed before. Interesting in this connexion are the following question and answer at Nehru's Press Conference in New Delhi, 30th July, 1953.

"Question - I heard over the (Pakistani) radio last night that whereas India is neutral Pakistan is definitely a Partisan as far as this conflict is concerned.

Answer - That has been the position for a long time past. There is nothing new about that except a clearer statement". Jawaharlal Nehru:  
Press Conference, 1953, n.8, p.61.

21. Seminar, New Delhi, November, 1965.



No analysis of Indo-Pakistani problems is possible unless one takes in to account this major international foundation on which the superstructure of Pakistani pressure on India rests. The fact that an anti-Western power also now takes full advantage of this situation does not alter the situation in any basic way. The last and most important of all factors was that in dealing with Pakistan, India was not dealing with a country whose responses and reactions to Indian policies could be easily anticipated and whose pattern of behaviour was normal. "It has always been a serious problem to calculate the possible effects of a policy of Pakistan's attitude to India"<sup>22</sup>.

Briefly, the crisis of identify, the status conflict, and the conflict of images which lay at the root of the Indo-Pakistani conflict are too deeprooted to be eliminated by simple gestures of friendship or by concessions in the settlement of disputes.

#### New Factors Calling for Change in Policy:

The major changes which have occurred in the situation may be errumerated as follows:

The basic Indian assumption that because of India's friendly relations with all other great powers,

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22. See Sisir Gupta, "Indo-Pakistan Relations", International Studies, Bombay, Vol.5, pp.174-9.

Pakistan will not be able to present a power challenge to India has ceased to be valid. What is more, India has as its enemy, and Pakistan as its ally. Country which is -

- a) a neighbour of India's;
- b) a power prepared to use force to achieve its objectives if and when circumstances permit it do so;
- c) a power whose friendship with Pakistan has improved Pakistan's leverage in dealing with other major power<sup>23</sup>.

Alignment of Pakistan were directed against India and not against any other great powers. It has not created an automatic worsening of Pakistan's relations with other powers. It has apparently succeeded in convincing its other friends that its close and intimate relations with China are not entirely unhelpful to others. For one thing, Pakistan provides a vital channel of communication between people's China and its adversaries, for another, Sino-Pakistani relations help the realization of a goal which even the

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23. International Studies Quarterly Journal of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, India's Policy towards Pakistan, by Sisir Gupta, Vol.8, Nos.1-2, July-October, 1966.



West considers important in itself - a solution of Kashmir and other problems between India and Pakistan to the satisfaction of Pakistan.

#### Major Problems:

The problem which both India and Pakistan had to face immediately after partition was the struggle for Kashmir constituted a major factor in India - Pakistan relations. According to Michael Brecher:

" Kashmir symbolises the root of the conflict between India and Pakistan. Here lies the last field of battle over the ideological cleavage which rent the sub-continent as under in 1947. Here is the final test of the validity of the two-nation theory, the basis of Pakistan and its continuing *raison d'etre*"<sup>24</sup>.

The dispute over Kashmir was brought before the Security Council of the United Nations on 31st December, 1947, "where it still lies unsettled in spite of the efforts of United Nations Commission for the India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and three distinguished mediators"<sup>25</sup>.

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24. Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, op.cit. p.577.

25. For details see: Joseph Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton, 1954), Michael Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir* (Toronto, 1953), Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India. Pakistan Relations* (Bombay, 1966); Alastair Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir* (London, 1966).

Pakistan, however, refused to recognise the accession and continued to assist the 'Azad Kashmir' Government - the Government of that part of Kashmir forcibly occupied by the Muslim tribesmen. "In a speech broadcast on 4th November, 1947, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stated that the accession of Kashmir to India is a fraud perpetrated on the people of the Government of India"<sup>26</sup>.

In accepting Kashmir's accession the Indian Governor General had said, " when the invaders had been expelled and law and order re-established, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people"<sup>27</sup>.

On 31st December, 1947, when discussion between the two nations had produced no solution. India laid the matter before the Security Council under Article 35 of the United Nations Charter, and charged Pakistan with 'an act of aggression against India'.

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26. The Dawn (Karachi), 5th November, 1947.

27. Government of India, white paper on Jammu and Kashmir p.47, In telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan on 8th November 1947, Nehru confirmed the Principle of decession of the people but reiterated that the invaders must be driven from Kashmir and peace restored before a reference would be possible. Ibid., p.62.

Before speaking about the activities of this U.N. 'mediator', let us see how Britain and United States approached the Kashmir question at that time. As we mentioned in 1947-49 "Britain sought to 'solve' the Kashmir question by supporting Pakistan's claim to Kashmir"<sup>28</sup>. At the same time, Britain and the United States were united by the common desire to aggravate relations between India and Pakistan, so as to make easier for them to blackmail one or the other. For this, reason until 1953 neither the United States nor Britain had shown the slightest desire to achieve a settlement on the basis of talks between India and Pakistan. This shows as how India was pushed in a difficult situation in making her foreign policy. Super powers i.e. U.S.A. and Great Britain always have tried to play indifferent roles in Indo-Pakistan relations. Left to itself, Indo-Pakistan relations would have been improved but for the super power interest the relations between the two neighbours have always been subjected<sup>to</sup> strains.

Going over now to the various plans put forward by Dixon (An Australian Judge) in the summer of 1950, one may

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28. A detailed justification of Britains attitude was supplied by William Barton a high ranking British Official, in an article in the American Foreign Affairs, Magazine, which give six reasons, the main one being the establishment of an 'Islamic blocs of Pakistan and other middle East Countries as a 'barrier to communism'.

say that, "they boiled down to the holding of a plebiscite in some districts of Kashmir so as to effect its partition and establish UN control over the Kashmir valley"<sup>29</sup>.

Both India and Pakistan rejected Dixon's proposals. In a message to Dixon on August 16th, 1950, Nehru gave several reasons why the proposals were unacceptable to India stating above all that they were "opposed to our basic stand on the Kashmir issue"<sup>30</sup>. Pakistan however, rejected Dixon's proposals "because it would agree only to a partition of Kashmir which give it possession of the Kashmir valley"<sup>31</sup>.

As the Indian Government objected to the discussion of the Kashmir question by the Conference, Liaquat Ali Khan said on December 21st, 1950, that in the case he would not go to the Conference. But on January 4th, 1951, it became known that Nehru had agreed to an unofficial discussion and together with Attlee urged Liaquat Ali Khan to attend the Conference, on January 6th, Pakistan Prime Minister arrived in London and on January 14th the British Government

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29. Yuri Nosenko. 'Jawaharlal Nehru & India's Foreign Policy', Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, p.139.

30. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir- A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1967, p.219.

31. Ibid., p.219.

released a brief communique stating as the results of friendly talk "points of disagreement were narrowed although agreement has not been reached"<sup>32</sup>.

While the official communique did not disclose the substance of the talks, the Pakistan Prime Minister did so. Speaking in London on January 16th, 1951, he said that three suggestions had been made. (i) The first was to station in Kashmir troops from common wealth countries (Australia and New Zealand had agreed to lend troops, (ii) The second was to ask India and Pakistan to station a combined force in Kashmir during plebiscite, and the (iii) The third was to authorise the plebiscite, Administrator to raise troops locally.

Pakistan was willing to accept each of these suggestions but India had rejected all the three<sup>33</sup>.

Going on to describe the attitude taken by the internal political forces in India on the Kashmir question, we must note that while the National Congress Party gave full support to the Government, nearly all the opposition parties,

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32. The Hindu, Madras, January 17th, 1951.

33. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir-A study in India-Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1967, p.147.

advocating Kashmir's accession to India and firmly supporting Nehru in regarding the introduction of foreign troops in to Kashmir as unthinkable, criticised the Government for having referred the matter to the United Nations. Thus the Communist Party of India came out for Kashmir's accession to India and as was mentioned earlier, tried to convince the people of Kashmir that it was in their interests as the democratic movement in India was at a higher level.

Acting from entirely different positions, the Hindu chauvinist parties which, from the start, were using the Kashmir question as the target of their campaign for a 'tough policy', towards Pakistan, were also critical of having referred the question to the United Nations,"and in 1951 demanded that the matter be withdrawn from the Security Council. This demand was publicly made by Khare, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha"<sup>34</sup>.

On March 31st, 1952, the Constituent Assembly approved the recommendation on non-payment of compensation. " On April 19th, Shaikh Abdullah amplifying the idea that the constitution of India was not applicable to Kashmir would be unrealistic childish and savouring of lunacy", and recalled that Kashmir had recognised India's Soverignty only with respect to defence foreign policy and communications."<sup>35</sup>

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34. The Hindustan Times, April 10th, 1951.

35. Lord Birdwood, Two Nations & Kashmir, Robert Hale Limited, London, 1956, p.166.



These developments in Kashmir promoted rather than hindered, the holding of talks directly between the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan which had started in June, 1953.

The point is that in his address to Parliament on February 11th, 1953. President Prasad noted "a certain improvement" in relations with Pakistan"<sup>36</sup> sometime later, the improvement of relations with Pakistan was welcomed by the Congress Working Committee. These judgements of the states of India Pakistan relations were based above all on the fact that some signs had appeared indicating the desire on the part of Pakistan leaders to settle relations with India by direct talks. Thus, January 26th, 1953, the Republic Day, Prime Minister of Pakistan Khwaja Nazimuddin (who became premier after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October, 1951), speaking at a function in the Indian High Commission in Karachi, stressed the need for Indo-Pakistan amity"<sup>37</sup>.

Krishna Menon stated the basic Indian approach to Kashmir before the Council on 21st February, 1957:

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36. Parliamentary Debates, Council of State, 1953, Vol.III, No.1, Col.18.

37. S.Gupta, op.cit.,p.255.

"The State of Jammu and Kashmir is a constituent unit of India by law, by equality by every moral and political considerations, and the only authority that can legally separate the State is the Soverign Parliament of India. The territorial integrity of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is inviolable. India cannot accept the situation of the so called defacto occupation of part of Kashmir by Pakistan, this means the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the whole area and the responsibility of the Union of India for the security of the Union as a whole can not be questioned. India will abide by the commitments she had made, taken together with the assurances given to her by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The Security of India has to be viewed in the light of the enormous amount of war material that has come into Pakistan through United States military aid"<sup>38</sup>.

D.Som Dutt states " the strategic aim of India's foreign policy was to remain aloof from the power blocs,"<sup>39</sup> that is

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38. SCOR Twlfth Year, 77<sup>th</sup> 4th Meeting, Paras, 32-36.

39. D.S om Dutt, 'Foreign Military Aid and the Defence strength and Policies of India and Pakistan. International Studies, Quarterly Journal of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, Vol.8, Nos.1-2, July-October, 1966, p.65.

to say, not to ally itself with either the United States <sup>or</sup> of the Soviet Union. Non-involvement would mean living in peace, and time and opportunity would present themselves for going ahead with the economic development of the country, and the establishment of a democratic form of government with socialism as its goal. This attitude was welcome to both the power blocs, and considerable success attended India's efforts not only in the domestic field but also in the sphere of international affairs, giving it a stature of some significance in a comparatively short time.

The constructive role it played in the Korean crisis, in limiting the conflict in Indo-China and in the support it rendered to the United Nations in the Congo, Gaza and elsewhere, was not without its effect on world opinion. The success of non-alignment convinced it of its efficacy in the pursuit of peace, and therefore, it became the corner stone of India's foreign policy. Almost inevitably, this also led to insufficient attention being paid to military preparedness of the country. "It was the war with China in 1962, and again the war with Pakistan in 1965, that disproved the belief which had apparently root that non-alignment was a sufficient substitute for military strength in determing external aggression"<sup>40</sup>.

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40. Ibid., p.66.

"Military stores were divided 3:2 with India giving Rs.6 crores in lieu of the ordinance factories which of course could not but remain in India"<sup>41</sup>. Of first importance to the forces of course was the determination of the size and shape that the services would take. The policy makers narrowed down India's military commitments to the maintenance of internal security and the safeguarding of the borders with Pakistan and along the Himalaya. D.Som Dutt on 'foreign military aid and the defence strength and policies of India and Pakistan pointed which is quoted here in length as it is unavoidable,

"... as a background to a discussion of this subject, it would be as well to recall the degree of security that existed in the subcontinent of India during pre-independence days. The British had, by the end of the nineteenth century, assured the safety of the two coastal sides of the geographical triangle of India. Along the third side, which was the land mass of the Himalaya in the North, it had always been the concern of the British to keep Russia at arms length. The successful conduct of wars in Afghanistan, and the establishment of the Durand line (as it came to be known) in the tribal areas of the old North-West

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41. Government of India, After Partition (Delhi,1948), p.96, Quoted in Wayne. A.Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York,1964).

frontier province, blocked the traditional invasion route to India from the North-West effectively. Tibet was created as a buffer, friendly relations were established with Nepal after a war with that Kingdom. Sikkim was made into a protectorate and Bhutan was obliged to be guided in matters of foreign relations and defence. It was a little consequent to the British if boundaries and borders remained under marked and ill-defined, because there was no outside power military capable of making and issue of claims on the border which they might have wished to prefer"<sup>42</sup>.

Hence in this chapter we have tried to analyse the Kashmir issue as a factor in the making of India's foreign policy. Nehru was much influenced by the 'Kashmir issue', as he was very <sup>t</sup>cautious in his approach. The various leaders had expressed their view which have been examined. All this point that the British did not leave behind a swift path for a independent India, but nevertheless it left behind a legacy. The Kashmir issue, perhaps, the British rule in India entered a new phase of politics by granting Independence to India and creating Pakistan.

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42. D, Som Dutta, 'Foreign Military aid and the Defence Strength & Policies of India and Pakistan', International Studies, Quarterly journal of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, Vol.8, Nos.1-2, July-October, 1966, p.64.

Nehru was aware of these facts and was a gifted personality to have definite foresight in accepting a non-aligned foreign policy. It is for anyone's conclusion to note as what would an aligned foreign policy would mean to these two nations; i.e. India and Pakistan. Though India adopted a very sound foreign policy, a best alternative, still both India and Pakistan have become factors in their respective foreign policies which is worth examining.

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(1) No corollary - as to Kashmir  
and domestic sources - relation  
to India  
(2) File & file chapter