

CHAPTER THREE

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India's foreign policy conducted under the guidance of Jawaharlal Nehru is a subject of interest to all observances of international affairs. Besides indologists find " India was the first nation to have pursued a policy that was new to the very history of international relations i.e. the policy of ' non-alignment '. This policy has been adopted by many who recently became free i.e. Asian and Africian countries which now play an important role in world politics." ¹

Thus, a study of the history of non-alignment policy, of the circumstances explain the choice of this policy, the international and domestic political factors that led to its implementation and the prospects of its further development should be of considerable, scientific and practical interest. To understand the evolution of the policy of ' non-alignment ' it is quite essential to trace the basis of non-alignment and the gradual changes in the foreign policy as viewed by Jawaharlal Nehru, who helped to formulate India's foreign policy, and put it into action during the first seventeen years of India's independent development.

' Non-alignment ' has been widely misunderstood and mis-interpreted both in India and abroad. To these mis-interpretations Nehru and Nasser have always tried to clear up the mis-conceptions and have explained the meaning of non-alignment in realistic terms. After India achieved independence was to frame her own foreign policy; she was much influenced by various factors which we have assessed in the first two chapters. Nehru had a scientific view, but never the less he had also ideals before him. Gandhism had a strong hold on the Indian life and the way of thinking. Nehru's personality had also been influenced by various factors. His western education, his participation in the freedom movement, the diversity in Indian society, all needed a scientific approach before defining India's foreign policy. The Gandhian approach towards international relations had also a great impact on his mind, which had laid down the path of peaceful co-existence by means of pursuing various ' Congress Resolutions ' from time to time.

Besides these influences Nehru was also aware of the problems faced by the nation on the eve of independence. India achieved Independence in a very crucial period of international politics. Bipolarism had a great effect on India's future recourse in international politics. " He wanted to be true to the traditions laid down under Gandhiji's leadership, but never the less he also wanted to be realistic in making the foreign policy.

Nehru was put in a very difficult situation in defining India's foreign policy. He realised the importance of Gandhian approach to inter-national politics, and equally was aware of the international morality, which worked against the moral principles propogated by Mahatma Gandhi."²

Nehru himself explained clearly the reasons for his decision to discard the Gandhian ethics in a speech to the constituent assembly on March 8th, 1949, which is quoted here in length.

" We were bred in a high tradition under Mahatma Gandhi... And with that idealism and ethical background we now face practical problems and it becomes an exceedingly difficult thing to apply that particular doctrine to the solution of these problems. That is conflict which individuals and groups and nations have often had to face. We have not often thought enough of Gandhiji and his great doctrine, of his great message and while we praised it often enough we felt.

Are we hypocrites, talking about it and being unable to live up to it ... if we are hypocrites, then surely our future is dark. We may be hypocritical about the small things of life but it is a dangerous thing to be hypocritical about the

great things of life. And it would have been the greatest tragedy if we exploited the name and prestige of our great leader, took shelter under it and denied in our hearts, in our activities, the message that he brought to this country and the world ... we can not and I am quite positive that our great leader would not have had us behave as blind automations just carrying out what he had said without reference to the changes in events."³

It was a curious thing that we who carried on the struggle for freedom in a non-violent and peaceful way ... should have had to undertake a kind of war in part of the country. The whole thing seemed to be a complete reversal of all that we stood for, and yet circumstances were such that I am quite convinced that we had no other way and that the way we took was the right one.

NON-ALIGNMENT AND HINDUSM :

In the opinion of another Indian scholar Bhaskaran R. who does not seem to take Nehru or anybody else seriously ; points " our non-alignment like our non-cooperation and non-violence is a principle of conduct tested and proved viable in four millenia of civilized existence It is essentially an

Indian principle demanding an open eye in difference to the discipline of consequences. Its basis like that of every thing else, India is religious and is to be found in the permanent unshakable faith in a divine ordering of the universe which permits endless variety and does not a call for human exertion to extinguish difference and promote uniformity."⁴

Here certain facts may be noted, which claim that, non-alignment as a principle has a religious base. Nehru as the chief architect of India's foreign policy ; has been pointed by many critics that " Nehru was much influenced by the Hindu view of the ultimate truth perhaps it would be easier to make such a claim about Gandhiji. But Gandhiji himself " is reported to have said that Nehru is an Englishman".⁵

Nehru had equipped himself with varied influences and by the time he became the first Prime Minister, he had certainly realised the future course of India's foreign policy. It is for this same reason, Gandhiji and Nehru differed on almost all important political issues. Nehru's outlook was shaped by European sensibility. We must recognise that non-alignment was also the product of these influences. As a well informed Indian writer puts it. " In fact it is the British and west European current of thoughts which have for decades been influenced Indian

elite thinking on world affairs.⁶ It is a well recognized fact that the non-alignment is practised successfully by a large number of Afro-Asian nations,⁷ to-day i.e. United Arab Republic,⁸ Yugoslavia etc. Especially by the United Arab Republic and not to speak of Yugoslavia which is a European country. India, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic evolved it independently and drew inspiration from each other. All this points to the growing importance of non-aligned foreign policy which has gained importance not because of the religious influence on a foreign policy, but because of the practability of the policy of non-alignment.

The word non-alignment has had mis-conceptions, and was critised largely because it was for the first time coined by India as a principle of foreign policy in international politics. Perhaps the true meaning of policy, which lacks proper definition or meaning is never realised until it is subjected to such criticisms. It is this main reason as to why India's foreign policy was subjected to various misinterpretation and criticism. At the out set the close association of the concept ' non-alignment ' with other concepts like ' non-violence ' and non-cooperation seems to have contributed towards this mis-conception. In this, it resembles the idea of non-resistence, non-violence and nirvana (non-illusion).¹⁰

The view conflict's with Nehru's own views. In fact, Nehru rarely used the term 'non-alignemtn' in this early speeches on foreign policy.¹¹ It is also reported¹² to have expressed dissatisfaction over it for its supposedly negative connotation. For the same reason, Nassar and other Arabs prefer the term 'positive neutralism'.¹³ In 1947, for example he said, 'we have proclaimed during the past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else.'¹⁴ And in 1952, he said, 'you for my part, fail to see how this approach is natural'.¹⁵ Again in 1958 he declared "when he say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously we mean non-alignment with military blocs. It is non-negative policy. It is a positive one and, I hope, a dynamic one".¹⁶ It is worth noting that the policy of non-alignment as pursued by India and other countries in Asia and Africa has some important characteristic distinguishing it from classical neutrality adhered to by some European States.

Firstly non-alignment is practised by a State not as a corollary of any written international agreement but as the basis of the foreign policy.

Secondly it is a way determining the entire foreign political activities and relations of a State in peacetime as well, not being neutral in the military sense, i.e. the conduct of a State after the beginning of hostilities.

Previously the Indian Government held that in order to preserve peace, India must keep away from military blocs. But to repeat, it gradually came to understand that non-participation alone is not enough to keep away from war.

" There is not the shadow of doubt " Nehru told parliament in August 1958 that,

" If a war is once started, the full panoply of the weapons of the automic age will reveal itself".¹⁷

India began to come out actively for the preservation of general peace, demanding disarmament and cessation as a first step, of nuclear tests. She sharply criticised the United States for its policy from a position of strength and was the initiator of the five principles of peaceful co-existence of States".¹⁸

India's non-participation in military blocs, Nehru stressed became a definitely positive and dynamic policy and made " India's name associated with peace " in every part of the world.¹⁹

Prime Minister Nehru, and after him also many other political leaders of younger sovereign states, came to understand that full elimination of colonialism and peaceful co-existence of

States with different social system are indispensable conditions for the achievement of India's non-participation in blocs was transformed in to a policy of positive neturality of India's efforts against colonialism and for a everything another world war. Nehru did not approve even the term " positive neturality".²⁰ I do not even like ' positive Neturality' as is done in some countries..." He had instead preferred such pharases,²¹ as ' keeping all of from blocs', ' Independent policy ', and ' Friendly relations with all', etc., and he declared repatedly that his foreign policy was neither ' negative ' or ' passive '... As was mentioned earlier, India's policy of positive neturality was supported by the majority of Asian and African countries.

What was then the attitude of Soviet Union to neturalist foreign policy ?

It was set out clearly in the Report of the Central Committee to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU which said,

" A few years ago there were two appossing camps in world affairs, i.e. the Socialist and Imperialist camps. Today an active role in international affairs is also being played by those countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America that have freed, or are freeing themselves from foreign oppression. Those countries are often called neturalist though they may be considered netural

only - in the sense that they do not belong to any of the existing military or political alliances. Most of them, however, are by no means neutral when the cardinal problem of our day, that of war and peace is at issue. As a rule those countries which have won their liberty from colonialism are becoming a serious factor for peace, for the struggle against colonialism and imperialism and the basic issues of world politics can no longer be settled without due regard for their interest."²²

A basic document like the CPSU programme adopted by the 22nd CPSU Congress States, " The C.P.S.U. regards it as its internationalist duty to assist the people who have set out to win and strengthen their national independence, all peoples who are fighting for the complete abolition of the colonial system".²³

It is on this basis and similar other statements of Nehru and particularly of the phrase ' Mental outlook of India', that the whole edifice of the philosophical or cultural basis of India's foreign policy has been raised by Indian scholars. " The essence of mental outlook", says Appadorai, " Is a spirit of tolerance among the common people in India, who have inherited

the traditions from their scriptures and from their history."²⁴

" This is a questionable view as the existence of such social evils as untouchability and communalism would go to show.

Appadorai himself admits that fact.²⁵ Moreover, the " teachings of Buddha and the life and death of Gandhiji would have been superfluous if non-violence and tolerance were already part of the Indian mind."²⁶ " Indifference appears to be a better word to describe the dominant trait of the Indian mind."²⁷ Only great souls have been able to rise above this level and see reality. Hence their teachings.

Be that as it may, the fact that Nehru had laid the greatest stress on " every circumstances that goes towards making the thought of India on these subjects", cannot either be forgotten or bypassed. As already indicated Nehru also said that these circumstances were common to the whole of Asia and Africa. Moreover, there is nothing in Nehru's statements to suggest that he was referring to the influence of Hindu philosophy and scriptures on India's foreign policy. As seen already, he had clearly rejected Gandhiji's ideals as impracticable quite early in his career as India's foreign minister. Thus the words " inherent in the whole mental outlook of India " do not refer to the influence of Indian philosophy and scriptures at all. All that Nehru meant was. In my opinion, that India's

foreign policy " was in line with the policy which we had broadly thought of even before we became independent."²⁸

Even though the pre-independence thinking of Indian leaders was idealistic and moralistic mainly under the influence of Gandhiji, Nehru made it clear. As early as 1947, that it did not suit an independent India because as he said, " foreign affairs are utterly realistic today. A false step a false phrase makes all the difference. This realism has been the most distinct feature of India's foreign policy as also of the United Arab Republic".²⁹ It was the failure to understand this subtle change from the pre-independence day that had misled many to describe" Nehru as an idealist and a dreamer."³⁰

NON-ALIGNMENT AND ISLAM :

Nasser has often said that " our policy emanates from our country, our land and our conscience". Does this mean that non-alignment of the Arabs has its basis in Islam ? Nasser has claimed that it is so."³¹ As Fayaz A. Sayegh has observed " The marks of Islam upon the thought processes and expressions of Muslim leaders, in matters relating to internal affairs, are pervasive and unmistakable, but in matters pertaining to international affairs in general and neturalism in particular, the

reasoning of the contemporary generations of Muslim leaders in in-distinguishable from that of non-Muslims. " Nasser, Nehru and Nkrumah... seem to speak the same language and to draw inspiration from the same public philosophy, when they discourse on neturalism and the cold War." ³² He has also observed that, " Leadership in establishing the doctrinaire grounds of neturalist policy has come from Hindu and Buddhist statesman... The majority of Muslim neturalist leaders, however, have remained imperious to the doctrianaire fector in neturalism." ³³ In short, as he has put it, " Islam is irrelevant to neturalism." ³⁴

NON-ALIGNMENT & NON-INTERFERENCE :

Another misconception about non-alignment which needs to be dispelled is the view that it means non-interference or non-intervention in the affairs of others, which one may add, formed parts of the Panch Sheel. ³⁵ In practice the non-aligned states interfere, and have interfered in the internal affairs of neighbouring states as the other big powers often do or have done. India had continuously interfered in the domestic affairs of its neighbours like Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. This aspect of India's foreign policy has been forcefully explained by an Indian Scholar J.W. Burton, ' International Relations, a General Theory ' who wrote that " we find that in dealing with these

territories, India simply looks up the mantle of the old British diplomacy of direct or indirect control over these territories, if only for the security of India. Indian policy in Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagadh comes under this category. The agreements with Sikkim and Bhutan place them as vassal states of India. Though, Nepal is still regarded as a Sovereign State, interference by India in her domestic affairs is now too well known and is resented among the vocal sections of the Nepalese population. As in other territories, the question of India's security must have been the predominant thought behind this interference."³⁶

The aid given by India to Burma during the Civil War in 1949 has been criticized as an interference in Burma's internal affairs, though Nehru denied it. Nehru's opposition to Pakistan's acceptance of arms from the United States could be called, " Interference " in the internal affairs of the neighbouring countries. Nehru did not deny this, but in defence of the same he pointed, " that the matter was too important for India to remain silent. He went further and said that, it was not merely against the freedom of India but against the freedom of Asia as a whole, Nehru opposed the South-East Treaty Organisation on much the same lines.³⁷ In fact, Nehru's " Asia Policy " or the ' peace area ' approach was a sort of Monroe Doctrine which declared that South Asia was India's primary concern as shall be seen later.

Finally, India is said to have violated the Panch Sheel when it gave asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959.³⁸ For example, Lord Lind-say, observed, " The reasons for the revolt in 1959 belong to Chinese internal policies. The international repercussion came from Indian expressions of sympathy with the revolt."³⁹

THE MEANING OF NON-ALIGNMENT :

Non-alignemnt is a policy based on the principle of balance of power and its main objective is the protection of the security of the nation. Thus is it a complex concept having different aspects all of which aim at the same main objective, namely, the security of the nation. Its various aspects were very well explained as follows by Nehru in the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Lok Sabha on December 9th, 1958.

" When we say our policy is one of non-alignment, abviously we mean non-alignment with military blocs.... This in itself is not a policy, it is only part of a policy... "

" The policy itself can only be a policy of acting according to our best judgement and furthering the principle objectives and ideals that we have. Every country's foreign

policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress. Security can be obtained in many ways. The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true. It is equally true that security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else...

... Apart from this, from the larger point of view of the world also we have laboured to the best of our ability for world peace... Our foreign policy has this positive aspects of peace. The other positive aspects are an enlargement of freedom in the world, replacement of colonialism by free and independent countries and large degree of co-operation amongst nations".⁴⁰ What did Nehru mean by " acting according to our best judgement" and " an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue" ? Did it mean objectivity or impartiality as has been often claimed⁴¹ by many critics both in India and abroad ? The answer is no.

For Nehru in this context pointed in 1948 that " Our instructions to our delegates have always been first to consider each question in terms of India's interest, secondly on its merits. I mean to say if it did not affect India, naturally on

its merits and not merely to do something or give a vote just to please this power or that power, though of course, it is perfectly natural that is our desire to have friendship with other powers, we avoid doing anything which might irritate them."⁴² India's interest are paramount because -

The art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis a Government functions for the good of the country it governs and no Government dare to do the disadvantages of that country.

" Therefore, whether a country is imperialist or socialist or communist its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interest of that country. But of course some people may think of the interest of their country regardless of other consequences or take a short distance view. Others may think that in the long term policy, the interest of another country is as important to them as that of their own country. The interest of peace is more important because if war comes everyone suffers so that in the long distance view, Self interest may itself demand a policy of co-operation with other nations, good will for other nations, as indeed it does demand."⁴³ This makes Nehru's view on dynamic naturalism amply clear.

Thus neither peace nor good will for other nations have been ends in themselves. Peace is necessary to the extent it secures India's security and development. Similarly Nehru said that, " we cannot perhaps be friendly always with every country ... Naturally you are more friendly with those countries with whom you have closer relations... Naturally, again, we are likely to be more friendly to some countries than to others because this may be to our mutual advantage but even so, our friendship with other countries should not bring us inevitably into conflict with some other country."⁴⁴

NON-ALIGNMENT IS BALANCE OF POWER POLICY :

Very few people seem to realize that this policy of non-alignment with military blocs and friendship with all countries to protect the security of the nation is in reality a policy based on the balance of power principle. The difficulty arises out of mis-conception about non-alignment such as those examined earlier, and also of the balance of power principle itself. As Penrose has aptly observed " the idea of balance of power is often a stumbling block to the general reader, and sometimes, a source of confusion to the student of international relations." ⁴⁵

The first aspect of non-alignment, that is, not joining power blocs or entangling alliances, or as Penrose described it, the maintenance of a defensive balance of power " Penrose and Nehru himself have laid stress, that were favourable for the non-alignment of so many Afro-Asian States. Among the most important of these was the emergence of a more or less stable balance of power among the big powers, by 1945 or so, which not only ruled out the possibility of another World War, even before the advent of Nuclear Parity."⁴⁶

All these factors created an atmosphere congenial to non-alignment. Nehru was quick to grasp this fact, for it was in 1946 that he first came out with his declaration, of non-alignment as the basis of India's foreign policy, And in 1949, he declared categorically that, " there has been a great deal of talk about the possibilities as there were have receded. I do not think there is any great chance of any war on a big scale, on a world scale in the near future."⁴⁷

Again in a debate in Parliament in 1955, Nehru said, " if you extend the argument, you will see that the only way to avoid conflicts is to accept things more or less as they are. No doubt, many things require to be changed, but you must not think of changing them by war... Further by enlarging the area of peace that is of countries which are not aligned to this group or that, but which are friendly to both, you reduce the chance

of war."⁴⁸ This statement of Nehru accurately explains the basis of non-alignment as a balance of power policy."⁴⁹ " And if the big powers were suspicious of each other and were keen to have as many of the small states of Asia and Africa aligned on their side as was the case in the late 1940's small states were more suspicious of the big powers because of their strength and power."⁵⁰ Nehru was determined to make India, as far as possible, self-reliant. The politics of non-alignment would serve both these aims.

Considerationsof external security also might have been compromised through a military alliances in a number of ways, but Nehru always felt that military alliance is (was) likely to affect the external sovereignty of state especially with regard to treaties bilateral and multilateral relations with others state " finally military alliances with a big powers might have undermined the morale of the armed forces and seriously weakened the will of the people to defend their sovereignty against external attack or interference."⁵¹ This shows that he was very clear in his mind as to what he meant by non-alignment. The world was divided into two mighty camps, the communist and the anti-communist and either of the parties could not understand how any one could be so foolish enough not to line up with itself.

" We propose to continue with it ... we have no intention to turn communist. At the same time, we have no intention of being dragooned in any other direction ... We have chosen our path and we propose to go along, it and to vary as and when we choose, not at somebody's dictate or pressure and are not afraid of any other country imposing its will upon us by military methods or any other methods... our thinking and our approach do not fit in with this great crusade of communism or crusade of anti-communism."⁵²

Nehru shared the idealistic urge of the Indian National Movement but tried to give it a less romanticist and more historical outlook and the humanitarian content of Marxism. As a realist he saw the destructive potentialities of nuclear war and the idealist Nehru tried to look beyond the immediate sphere of political and ideological crusade for a tomorrow of peaceful co-existence and even to dream of one world. " Nehru is not only the exponent of the dreams deeply nestled in the hearts of the people of India. He is also the expression of the human conscience itself.... "⁵³. In this critical movement of human history " Bertrand Russell wrote in 1959, it would be Nehru who, " will lead us out of the dark night of fear in to a happier day".⁵⁴ Nehru did not always succeed in achieving a rational synthesis between idealism and realism in the detailed implementation of his foreign policy."⁵⁵ But this synthesis was

largely achieved in the broad policy of non-alignment which constituted the very foundation of his foreign policy. Bertrand Russell was very apt when he pointed that, it was only Nehru to lead us out of the dark night. Nehru was sure of the impact of non-aligned foreign policy of the prevailing atmosphere of cold war in international politics.

The first concern of India has always been to avoid major conflicts between and with great powers, for its own security as much as for world peace. Hence Nehru also made it clear by pointing " the supreme question, that one has to face today in the world is, how can we avoid a world war ?"⁵⁶. This aspect points Nehru's foresight in pursuing non-aligned foreign policy. It is this aspect of Nehru because of which he gained world wide popularity, and though he was dubbed as idealistic, it can be said he was more realistic in this approach, in his predictions of the future of India's destiny. Nehru meant by the acceptance of " things more or less as they are ? " the acceptance of the balance of power in the world especially between the big powers.

In this direction at the Belgrade Conference he asserted, " the whole frame work of the United Nations ever since its inception fifteen years ago, was recognition of the balance of

power in the world."⁵⁷ The fact that the ' Korean Crisis ' was the first occasion for India to play the role of a balancer does not seem to prove that this was a sudden shift in its foreign policy. Nehru had formulated his foreign policy as a complete whole and this was a part of the whole, as already indicated. The ' Korean Crisis ' only gave him the first opportunity to test his policy and its assumptions. Even before the ' Korean Crisis ' Nehru had made it clear. " I feel that India can play a big part, and may be an effective part in helping to avoid war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined up with any group of powers which for various reasons are full of fear of war and preparing for war. That is the main approach of our policy."⁵⁸

The ' Korean Crisis ' gave a chance to Nehru to prove what he meant of non-alignment. He participated in the ' Korean Crisis ' to prove that India has its own approach to international politics, and in that direction she would not mind how super-powers would feel. It was the ' Korean Crisis ' which brought importance to Nehru, and he proved that India's foreign policy dubbed as ' idealistic ' was ' realistic '. In the history of India's foreign policy, it is this even which was very important and it came as an eye-opener to many critics of India's foreign policy. Besides ' Korean Crisis ' also proved

that India practiced and it is not only preaching her ideals to the world.

The analysis of non-alignment would not be complete until one or two objections raised against it are examined. Brecher, for example, does not accept this view : " Is neturalism merely a twentieth century variation of the balancing process ? I think not. The basic difference is that the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century had sufficient powers to prevent the out break of war, or if war broke out, to throw its weights in to the scales in such a way as to ensure victory for one or another of the participants. Today no state can be a balancer in the nineteenth century, sense simply because of the gap between the power of the two-super-powers and all other is such that the addition of the power of India or any-body else would not make any difference."⁵⁹ Nehru clearly stated that, " when there is a substantial difference in the strength of the two apposing forces, we in Asia, with our limitations, will not be able to influence the issue. But when the two appossing forces are evenly matched, them it is possible to make our weight felt in the balance."⁶⁰ Nehru clearly this shows his deep analysis which had made in pursuing non-aligned foreign policy, and also the role which he wanted to play.

It is this kind of role that Nehru selected himself and India, as it was the only way in which he would play a part in world affairs and carve out a role for India and other small states which would otherwise have to join this side or that, dividing the world into two opposing blocs with no one to control them. Thus the very fact that certain states chose to remain aloof from the blocs meant a check to this dangerous trend towards bipolarity.

Thus Nehru said, " I am not conceited enough to imagine that we can control the fortunes of the world or prevent something happening that otherwise would happen. But there can be little doubt that we can occasionally at least make a difference. Well I hope that this country will make that difference whenever it has the chance and that difference will be in favour of peace."⁶¹ It can also be stated that Nehru wanted the so-called Asian-African countries underdeveloped and had problems of socio-economic and political similar to those in India, after emerging as independent should try to have a ' Identify ' of their own, and be not lost in the game of super-powers.

Thus non-alignment does not seem to provide so much ' an alternative game '62 to the balance of power, as it strengthens it and prevents it from reaching the breaking point. It is indeed a response to the inadequacies of the bipolar balance of power, rather than of balance of power, which was out to use weak, poor emerging independent nations as pawns in international game. It is something which is dynamic and ever changing and its success seems to depend upon its flexibility. As Palmer and Perkins have written " once bipolarity exists it tends to become rigid as well as unstable and a peaceful transition to a complex balance - one involving many states - become difficult."63 Non-alignment was an attempt to replace this balance by a complex balance of power in which as many of the major states or groups of states as possible could take part. The greatest significance of non-alignment perhaps lies in the fact that it announced the desire of the Asian and African states to enter the balance of power struggle in their own right.

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22. Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party, Of the Soviet Union, October 17-31, 1961, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p. 41.
23. Programme of the CP of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1961, p. 48.

24. Appadorai, A., The Foreign Policy of India, in Block J.E. and Thompson, K.W. (Ed.) ' Foreign Policies in the world of change, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1963, p. 488.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. p., 608.
28. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Selected speeches September 1946 - April 1961. New Delhi, 1961. Nehru, n.12, p. 97, and also pp. 83. For a good study of the views of the Indian National Congress on Foreign Policy matters prior to independence, see Prasad Bimla. The origins of Indian Foreign Policy. The Indian National Congress & World Affairs 1885-1947(2nd Ed.) Calcutta, 1962.
29. Ibid., Nehru n.12,p.97. See also speech at pp. 50-55. These two speeches of Nehru are extremely important for an understanding of Nehru's Foreign Policy & his approach to it which was thoroughly pragmatic & Political. In the latter speech Nehru even ridiculed talk of blocs as outdated.
30. See, Levi, Werner, Free India in Asia, Minneapolis, Uni. of Minnesota Press, 1952, p. 50.
31. See Sayegh, Fayez A. ' Islam and Neturalism ', in Proctor, J. Harries (ed.) Islam and International Relations, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965, p. 71. See also the contribution by Vatikiotis, p.J. ' Islamic and the acceptance of these views'.
32. Ibid., p. 73.

33. Ibid., pp. 82-83, Sayegh, no. 29, A Distinction is made between doctrinaire neturalism and pragamatic neturalism See Sayegh, n. 29, p. 10. In view of the dismissal above of the view that India's Foreign Policy has any doctrinare basis, this classification loses significance Nehru had been as much ' imperious' to the doctinaire factors in foreign policy as any other non-aligned statesman has been though he might have philosophied or theorised.
34. Ibid., p. 86 (Italics are mine)
35. For the text of the panch Sheel, see foreign policy of India, Text of Documents 1947-59, 2nd Edition. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, pp. 104, 113-14, (hereafter cited at texts of documents).
36. For the Text of Panch Sheel, See Foreign Policy of India, Text of Documents 1947-59, 2nd Edition, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, Nehru n. 12, pp. 471-72.
37. Ibid., p. 89.
38. For an account of the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet to India, see Moracs, Frank. The Revole in Tibet, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Jullundar, 1966, pp. 1-31.
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44. Ibid., Nehru I. n. 12. p. 45.
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54. Ibid., p. 243.
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