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CHAPTER V

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INDIA VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN  
AS FACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY

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CHAPTER VINDIA vis-A-vis PAKISTAN AS FACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY

India and Pakistan are factors in each other's foreign policy<sup>1</sup>. In the course of this chapter many incidental references have been made to the fact that the policies and actions of the Pakistani Government, both in respect of India and the rest of the world were largely determined by its hostility towards India. At least, relations with India has been the most important factor in Pakistan's foreign policy. Even though India's policies and actions with respect to Pakistan were determined by the same objective as towards all other nations, namely good will and friendship. It is equally true to say that relations with Pakistan which was suigner is in India's foreign relations was also one, but not the most important of the factors in her foreign policy.

India as a Factor in Pakistan's Foreign Policy:

Pakistan had many outstanding disputes and problems with India. Pakistan exaggerated and took undue interest in

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1. Refer India and Pakistan were equally factors in each other's internal policies too, as noted at different places in the course of the present chapter. For a pointed reference to the impact of Kashmir dispute on each others internal politics, See A.M. Rosenthal 'Kashmir's Far Reaching Impact', Foreign Policy Bulletin, 1st March, 1957, p.94.

the alleged maltreatment of the Muslim minority in India, as well as the continuing dislike of and jealousy with, the Hindus cultivated by Muslim Leaguers. In pre-partition India this was one reason why the Pakistani Press and politicians made hostility towards India is Pakistan's foreign policy has been persistently influenced by this factor since the creation of Pakistan. "Besides Pakistan had also used this as an instrument to divert the people's attention from the failures of the country vis-a-vis India or the desire of a particular government in power to remain in power. This hostility towards India by the government in power in Pakistan sometimes contributed to the stability of the government, or a rather untoward situation as far as India was concerned"<sup>2</sup>.

The Pakistani Government resorted to building up her military strength by foreign aid, particularly, American. It led Pakistan to the slippery slope of the Western camp. She became member of 'SEATO' and the 'Baghdad pact' respectively. " The fundamental departure in Pakistan's foreign policy from 1954 onwards, which was solely due to hostility

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2. The Hindu, 24th March, 1956.

towards India, naturally, led to India and Pakistan sometimes working at cross purposes in international forums<sup>3</sup>. This came out for the first time during the period of this survey in the course of the Colombo Prime Minister's Conference April-May, 1954.<sup>4</sup> " It was reflected in the deliberations of the Bandung Conference"<sup>5</sup>.

The divergent roles of the two countries was also reflected in their roles in other international forums especially in the United Nations. Outside the United Nations, perhaps the most important single world problem in regard to which they were in the opposite camps was in their respective

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3. The failure of India and Pakistan to agree on the ownership of the India office library in London was largely responsible for continuing deadlock in negotiations over the question between India and Britain. By insistence on prior agreement between India and Pakistan on the division of the library Pakistan contributed to the deadlock and to British inter-annuance on the settlement of the issue. The 'Hindu', 8th July, 1955.
  4. The Hindu, 25th July, 1954.
  5. House of People Debate, 30th April, 1955, pt.ii, Vol.iv, No.53, Col.6965.

attitudes to 'Suez' question. At the first 'London Suez Conference' in August, 1956, while India put forward her own plan for the Suez dispute," Pakistan supported the Dull's plan, eventhough it was not in harmony with the soverignty and dignity of Egypt with which Pakistan claimed to be very friendly by virtue of their common religion"<sup>6</sup>.

At the 11th UN General Assembly session in the course of discussion on the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression on Egypt, " Pakistan over enthusiastically supported the proposal of a UN force to guard the armistice lines between Egypt and Israel"<sup>7</sup>. In respect of the 'Hungarian Question', Pakistan was also an eager sponsor of a resolution providing

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6. In this connection, see the Dawn London correspondent's despatch 'foreign policy at cross-roads (in the issue dated 9th September, 1956) analysing the context a Pakistan's role at the London Suez Conference, the failure of Pakistan's foreign policy towards West Asian countries and the success of India's only, the correspondent's reasoning for these different results is inaccurate.

7. M.S.Rajan, 'India & Pakistan as Factors in each others foreign Policy and Relations', International studies, Bombay, Vol.13, p.360.

for UN supervised general elections. There was no doubt that with regard to both these proposals, "Pakistan's attitude was solely determined more by the hope of creating a precedent for similar actions in respect of the Kashmir dispute with India than by the merits of the two questions"<sup>8</sup>. Indeed the Pakistani Foreign Minister publicly referred " to the idea of a UN force replacing the Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir"<sup>9</sup>.

"This hostility towards India took different forms in the different regions of the world"<sup>10</sup>. In Western countries particularly the United States, Indian actions and policies were misrepresented by Pakistani sources as being crup to communist and anti-western and not, therefore, deserving of any Western aid or support. Pakistani sources frequently expressed annoyance at the fact that the United States should be giving India substantial economic and

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8. The Pakistani delegation to the United Nations in fact exploited the context of the Hungarian and Suez questions to bolster up Pakistani's case on the Kashmir question E.9. See the speech of the leader of the delegation General Assembly (G.A.) 11th Session. Plen. Mtgs. pp.270-1.
9. House of Parliament, *Debats*, 13th December, 1956, pt.VOl. ix, no.22, Cols.1428-9.
10. Council of State, (.C.S.Debates), 4th December, 1956, Vol. XV, No.12, Col. 1545-A.

technical aid for her development. "Reportedly, secret disapproval of Pakistan was a possible reason for American reluctance to sell to India large amounts of American surplus farm products in the middle of 1956"<sup>11</sup>.

Indeed, the most outstanding instance of Pakistan's hostility towards India in World Affairs on a matter absolutely unconnected with their bilateral relations was that concerning India's dispute with Portugal over self-determination for the people of Portuguese possessions in India.

The draft manifesto of the ruling party at the centre, the Muslim League, stated:

"After the subjugation of independent Hyderabad territory, the war-monger lust of Bharat (India) was directed towards independent Portuguese territories..."<sup>12</sup>

The Awami League leader and leader of opposition in Pakistan National Assembly (and a future Prime Minister), H.S.Suhrawardy, visited Goa and Lisbon as a Portuguese State guest in October, 1955 and April, 1956, respectively. On the latter occasion atleast the visit was with the

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11. See the Report in 'The Hindu', Madras, 30th July, 1956, Vol.XV, No.12, Col.1545-A.

12. The Hindu, Madras, 24th April, 1956.

connivance of Pakistani Government because it was fully publicized by official publicity channels. On his visit to Goa, Suhrawardy said, "after direct observation, he had not found, the slightest colonialism in Goa and injustice in the political, social and economic fields"<sup>13</sup>. At a Madrid Press Conference (after his visit to Lisbon), he was reported to have said that " India has no claim of any kind on Goa"<sup>14</sup>. Commenting on the Pakistani Governments official press release that during his visit to Lisbon, Suhrawardy discussed with the Portuguese Prime Minister and other officials matters of common interest between Portugal and Pakistan. The Hindu (26th April,1956), pungently remarked that the only 'common interest' between those countries was their common hostility towards India. Referring to this hostility, Nehru once pointed "Pakistani leaders disliked India so much that they wanted to injure India. Whenever and however they can"<sup>15</sup>. The Indian Government in

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13. The Hindu, 11th October,1955, For a glorified account of Suhrawardy's visit to Goa. Also refer 'Dawn' 26th October,1955.

14. 'Dawn', 16th April,1956.

15. The Dawn (Karachi) had a correspondent in Goa who sent rapidly anti-Indian reports regularly. The paper gave full publicity to portugues propaganda. It published the full text of Prime Minister Salazar's speeches and some special articles too, by him.



several times drew the attention of the Pakistani authorities to this friendly policy of the Government, the press and public of Pakistan's but absolutely in vain. All this point as how, India is considered always by Pakistan as a factor in shaping her foreign policy; and when this is a case, India also has to consider Pakistan as a factor in shaping her foreign policy. Perhaps this may also be a reason as to why the concept of non-alignment failed to define itself in the initial periods.

Pakistan as a Factor in India's Foreign Policy:

Both because of the more powerful geopolitical position and her general policy of friendship and goodwill for all nations "Pakistan was a far less important factor in India's foreign policy and relations"<sup>16</sup>. And so, India's relations with Pakistan were not quite different from that which India followed with reference to all other countries of the world. This is not to say that either Pakistan or any other country in the world saw India's policies and actions with respect to Pakistan in the same light as Indian's did. The Pakistani Government leaders and of course far more so the press and politicians, somehow seemed to be convinced, that India had a different policy towards Pakistan than from that followed by India with respect to all other countries, and that the subject of this special policy

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 16. For a contrary view, see A.M.Rosenhal (a former New York Time) correspondent in India Kashmir's Far-Reaching Impact, Foreign Policy Report, 1st March, 1957, p.93.

towards Pakistan was stated to isolate Pakistan from the rest of the world and to keep it permanently weak, so that (it was insinuated) India could dominate Pakistan and impose unilateral solutions on Indo-Pakistani disputes.

The Dawn (15th March, 1956) for instance remarked that " one of the principle objectives of India's foreign policy was that Pakistan should be friendless and defenceless so that we could be perpetually held to ransom and at some future time swallow up"<sup>17</sup>. Unfortunately, this typical view of the Pakistani elite was shared by some very responsible quarters in the west"<sup>18</sup>. This view, however, was more based on Pakistan's and Western dislike (for different reasons, though) to India's foreign policy of non-alignment.

Pakistanis seemed to believe that its whole object was to keep Pakistan isolated from either of the two blocks of the 'cold war' and thus keep her weak, so that India, as the most powerful of the non-aligned nations could exercise her hegemony over Pakistan. Of course India's

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17. See also 'Freelance' (Pseud) 'India's foreign policy Pakistan Review, February, 1955, pp.34-35, according to whom the object of India's policy was to humiliate Pakistan.

18. E.G. The Times (2nd June, 1956), editorial 'India's Two Faces'.

policy of non-alignment had nothing to do with relations with Pakistan as such, it was general policy meant to sustain and promote international peace and security. When, therefore, "India strongly opposed the granting of US military aid to Pakistan or the creation of the SEATO and Baghdad Pact, it was certainly not due to any hostility towards Pakistan or to the desire to keep Pakistan weak, as alleged by Pakistani spokesman and writers"<sup>19</sup>. India's genuine and sincere belief that thereby the 'peace area' of the uncommitted world would be reduced and the 'cold war' spread to a region in whose security, India was vitally interested. It would be true to say, however, that the intensity of India's opposition to these moves was due to the fear of the consequences of a military strong Pakistan or Pakistan's attitude and actions towards India. This was perfectly legitimate consideration in India's opposition to these moves because of the continuing hostility of that Government towards the Government and people of India almost since Independence.

Alternatively both Pakistani and Western sources have used the curious argument that India being the bigger country; could afford to show some considerations to her

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19. See e.g. Aslam Siddiqi, US Military Aid to Pakistan, Pakistan Horizon, 12 (1959), pp.45-52 and M.A.Chaudhari, Pakistan, India and the United States, Ibid.,6 (1953), pp.171-9. The Time, 6th June,1953.

smaller neighbour (Pakistan), "but that India had not done so any issue, but had on the other hand shown 'positive hostility"<sup>20</sup>.

Even though the Indian attitudes to these two issues were based on substantive grounds on the respective merits of the two questions," quite possibly they were also determined by the fear of Pakistan exploiting these precedents (which Pakistan in fact did on the former issue) for application to the Kashmir dispute"<sup>21</sup>

On other issue in Indo-Pakistani relations which was a factor in India's foreign relations was the treatment of the 40 million strong muslim minority in India. In order to project before the rest of the world the genuinely secular nature of the Republic of India, to refute Pakistani communal propoganda as well as to gain the goodwill of the Muslim countries of the world, especially in West Asia. The Indian Government made it a point to promote closer and cordinal relations with all Muslim countries of the world. India's desire to impress the rest of the world and more especially the Muslim countries of the genuineness of the secularism of the Indian State no doubt had some relevance to the Kashmir dispute as well. This was simply a case of following with greater intensity India's general

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20. G.W.Choudhary, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan,p.10.

21. See Werner Levi, Kashmir & India's Foreign Policy,  
Current History, June 1958, pp.340-5.

policy towards all other countries and did not, therefore, involve any untoward compromises in the basic principles of her foreign policy.

Perhaps relations with Pakistan was also, if not a minor but a factor in India's foreign relations with other Asian countries, particularly India's immediate neighbours. The desire not to give the slightest impression to the smaller neighbouring countries of India trying to lead or dominate these countries was possibly due also to fear of Pakistan exploiting any such feeling for damaging the goodwill and friendly feeling subsisting between India and those other countries. India's very close and friendly relations with Afghanistan and Burma, both on the outer frontiers of Pakistan was presumably due to this desire. Though if India wanted to be unfriendly to Pakistan, she could not have set against Pakistan, the two countries which already had border problems with Pakistan Afghanistan in respect of the 'Pakhtoonistan'<sup>22</sup> question, eventhough Pakistani Press propaganda made it appear that Afghanistan

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22. Refer the reply of the Deputy Minister for External Affairs H.F. (House of People), 17th December, 1955, pt.i. Vol.VII, No.21, Cols. 1141-2.

Also refer India and Her Neighbours: Hostility on 'Right and Left' Round Table, Vol.46 (1955-56), p.343.

was being battered by India in the former's demand for 'Pakhtoonistan'. The recent problems in Afghanistan have proved that India had nothing to do with these problems, which at least have had its own natural development.

The fact that one country is a factor in another's foreign policy need not necessarily be a good or a bad thing in itself. Whether it is good or a bad depends upon the nature of their relations. This is a great pity, considering that until a few years ago they formed one country and had common historical, political and economic background. The fact that today they are two independent, sovereign entities cannot blot out that background. Millions of peoples in both the countries have their kith and kin in the other country. Even in foreign policy, the two countries had some important common goals. Opposition to colonialism and racialism, desire for solidarity among the Asian-African countries (though, to a far lesser degree in Pakistan than in India)<sup>23</sup> and to strive for the economic development of Asian-African countries. In a general way,

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23. (Pakistan) does not believe in the limited concept of Asia such as appears to dominate Indian thinking or foreign policy. In the view of Pakistan to conceive of foreign policy on such a narrow basis is utterly incompatible with the environment in which we live. The fundamentals of Pakistan's foreign policy, Pakistan Horizon, Vol.9, p.50. Dawn (as cited in the Hindu, 24th January, 1954).

Pakistan also shared India's foreign policy goals of maintainance and promotion of international peace and security. A single, exception of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir and support to international organization.

All these common goals have, however, been overshadowed by their differences. The most fundamental of there is their divergent orientation in foreign policy, Pakistan is a member of the western bloc, while India has remained non-aligned. "India wholly stands solidarity among the Asian-African countries; Pakistan is more inclined towards solidarity among the Muslim countries only, through Pakistan's earlier Pan-Islamic zeal is now greatly reduced"<sup>24</sup>. These two differences all the main, together with blind history towards India, have produced an extreme distortions in Pakistan's sharing with India common goals in foreign policy, so that the identity of their common goals is almost recognizable, not only in the minds of Indian's and Pakistan's but also in the rest of the world.

All this point as how respective countries have become a factor in itself in respective foreign policies.

"India and Pakistan are close neighbours. It is only to be excepted that they will affect each other's foreign policy. Perhaps this natural phenomenon of mutual inter-action

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24. But see 'Fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy',  
Pakistan Horizon, Vol.9 (1956), pp.43-5.

would not have attracted much attention if these two states had not been persistently unfriendly since their emergence in to independent statehood"<sup>25</sup>.

India and Pakistan as factors in each other's foreign policy. "Firstly, as regards the policy nucleus, there is a great difference between India and Pakistan. When India conceived the policy of non-alignment, it thought in terms of its operation in the world at large and did not have to bother about Pakistan, which was far weaker than India in military and economic capabilities and in political prestige. In contrast, when Pakistan adopted the policy of military alignment with the west, it did so primarily to counter-balance India's military superiority and to extort political concessions from India with the support of powerful allies.

Secondly as regards the foreign relations of the two countries, there is much similarity as also some difference. Pakistan being always overshadowed by India's size and resources, the impact of India upon Pakistan's foreign policy seems to be much more obvious. But, as the

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 25. International Studies, Quarterly Journal of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, Vol.8, Nos.1-2, July-October, 1966. India and Pakistan as factors in each other's foreign policies, By Jayanta Kumar Ray, page 49.





present writer is inclined to emphasize, the influence of Pakistan upon India's foreign relations is much more prominent than most Indian's would like to admit.

Thirdly, " the attitudinal responses of India and Pakistan are basically alike in so far as these are moulded largely by now other countries, at a particular point of time, view their quarrels, especially the one over Kashmir"<sup>26</sup>.

When we reflect on the essentials of India's non-alignment policy (a policy that has the entire world for its field of operation, that has world peace as its primary goal, and that cannot conceive of India's interest except as an integral part of a peaceful world order), it is difficult to see how the fear or contempt or hatred of Pakistan has played any part in its formulation.

In contrast, when we turn to discover the mainspring of Pakistan's policy of military alignment with the west, we find it to be the fear and distrust of India. Inferiority to India in power and prestige makes Pakistan apprehended that India would always try to intimidate Pakistan and secure some of its political ends (e.g.in Kashmir), and that, at a suitable moment, India would also conquer Pakistan. "Pakistan entered into a military aid pact with the United States in May 1954 with the primary purpose of counter

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26. Ibid.,p.49.

balancing India's military superiority. "Pakistani newspaper writings left no doubt about this motivation behind Pakistan's decision to pursue the policy of military alignment"<sup>27</sup>.

"Pakistan also expected that their policy of military alignment would encourage the United States to cut off economic aid to India and to pressurise India for a solution of the Kashmir problem to the entire satisfaction of Pakistan. These expectations were not fulfilled, and with in only a few weeks of the conclusion of the US Pakistani military aid pact, Pakistani's stated condemning the United States for not fulfilling these Pakistani expectations"<sup>28</sup>.

India's dependence on Soviet support on the Kashmir issue, and the consequent and dilution of non-alignment, were to some extent revealed in the case of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. India deviated from the path of steadfast criticism of foreign military intervention to out a nationalist movement, and failed to suggest any strong step to checkmate soviet military action against Hungarian nationalists.

India even opposed the UN General Assembly resolution

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 27. Refer Editorials of Dawn (Karachi), 9th December, 1953, and of Morning News of (Karachi) 20th November, 1953, and 13th December, 1953.

28. Refer Editorials of Dawn, 7th June, 1954 and 18th August 1954.

advocating UN supervised elections in Hungary. India was obviously apprehensive that the United Nations might later compel India to accept the same solution for the Kashmir issue and that, in that event, only the Soviet Union could be expected to save India's discomfiture by opposing it. Pakistan was one of the sponsors of this General Assembly resolution. "After the resolution had been passed by the General Assembly, the Pakistani Government in fact did exploit the precedent of UNEF in respect of the Kashmir dispute and repeatedly urged a similar course of action in respect of Kashmir"<sup>29</sup>.

Only a few examples have been mentioned here:

These may be deemed sufficient to underline how Pakistan's change over, from a policy of alignment to qualified alignment was governed by considerations of its own situation vis-a-vis India.

"China was offering Pakistan a treaty of non-aggression including the guarantee of aid against aggression from any quarter. Pakistan, according to this report, appeared willing to accept this offer because it considered the major threat as emanating from India"<sup>30</sup>.

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29. M.S.Rajan, 'India & Pakistan as Factors in each other's Foreign Policy & Relations', International Studies, Bombay, Vol.3, p.360.

30. Washington Post, 25th November, 1962.

These aspects clearly indicate that Pakistan and India have been factors of influence in making of the respective foreign policies.

On 9th July, 1963, in the course of a speech at Rawalpindi, Ayub Khan broadly hinted that Pakistan would positively drift towards China. He emphasized that the Western Powers were helping China by following the wrong policy of arming India. He argued that western arms supply to India aggravated the threat from India to smaller Asian countries, and that they would be compelled to seek Chinese protection<sup>31</sup>.

Presumably, these smaller Asian Countries included Pakistan. A few days later on 17th July, 1963, Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, initiated a foreign policy debate, and argued that Pakistan had no alternative but to reshape its foreign policy in order to counter the threat from India alarmingly magnified by Western arms supply to India. Bhutto, made an oblique reference to a secret path with China as a counter weight to India's enhanced military might. Pakistan's protests to Western powers against their military support to India did not prove effective. But there was a new factor now strengthening Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India, Bhutto indicated "An attack on Pakistan's territorial integrity also involves the territorial integrity of the largest State

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31. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 10th July, 1963.

of Asia"<sup>32</sup>. said Bhutto, in other words China would come to the rescue of Pakistan if attacked by India.

It indicates that the policy of fundamentals to specific policy, one cannot fail to be struck by the affinity between India and Pakistan as regards their continual, influencing roles.

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32. Times of India, 19th July, 1963.