

CHAPTER - I.RISE OF THE JANATA PARTY1. Pre-dominantly one party system :-

The Janata party was the first opposition party to defeat the Congress party in the parliamentary elections. Rise of the Janata party was the result of complex interplay between different political elements in the country. Its sudden rise to power can not be understood if we do not study events preceding 1977 general elections in the present chapter an attempted is made to study the rise of the Janata party in the light of politics of the country after 1967 elections.

Eversince India embarked on a parliamentary system, the independence movement turned political party the congress has dominated the political scene so much that Indian parliamentary system has become a congress system.¹ One important reason of the prolonged congress dominance was the split in the opposition votes. The congress always benefitted from the division of opposition - votes. In the fourth general elections different opposition parties forged alliances to defeat the congress. Consequently, though the congress was not uprooted altogether but nonetheless suffered a setback. The opposition parties were encouraged to evolve an All India strategy to replace the ruling party after the post - 1967 elections. It could be termed as a new phase in Indian Parliamentary system.² Iqbal Narian called it as "an end of one party dominance"³ where as Harst Hartman commented "a healthy impact on public frustration and loss of faith in democracy were avoided"⁴

Relying the political scientists however, aftermath the fourth general elections, the polity experienced instability looming large especially over the states, marred by the fall of 32 state ministries and as many as 1969 cases of floor-crossings (defections) - A new dialectics of intra-struggle again encouraged stresses over the system. This exposed the bonafides of the opposition as an alternative to the ever dominating congress. The congress was split at the same time as a result of internal conflict within the party, a new party emerged known as the Congress (O) against the Congress (R) led by Mrs. Gandhi. Political observers thought the new development as a step forward to the formation of the alliance by the Jana-Sangh the Swatartra party and the Congress (O) to provide an alternative to the Congress (R). These opposition parties forged an alliance in the fifth Lok-Sabha elections more out of anti-congressism or rather "Indira Hatao" campaign and less out of positivism to provide an effective alternative based on economic programme; contrary to Mrs. Gandhi's "Garibi-Hatao" (Abolish poverty) and other socialistic programmes such as the abolition of privy purses etc. the grand alliance did not have any positive program. This was manifestly reflected in the result of fifth general elections as the Congress (R) secured 68% of seats (350 out of 518) and 43.6% of votes as against 54.1% of seats (262 out of 516) and 40.8% of votes in 1967 general elections (Please see table No.1 for Maharashtra).

	264	215	51.22	269	202	47.2	270	222	Votes.
Congress	264	215	51.22	269	202	47.2	270	222	56.36
SSP	-	-	-	46	4	4.2	-	-	-
CPI-M.	-	-	-	10	1	1.0	20	1	0.77%
Socialist Party.	14	1	0.50	-	-	-	52	3	4.58
BJP	79	15	7.48	59	19	7.8	58	7	N.A.
Cong O.	-	-	-	-	-	-	49	-	1.07
Swatantra	9	-	0.44	33	-	1.10	5	-	0.99
Andh Bangh	127	-	5.0	167	4	3.20	122	5	6.26
BJP	101	9	7.23	61	7	3.8	-	-	-
CPI.	56	6	5.9	41	10	4.87	44	2	2.73

Sources:

- (i) 1962 Elections "Report on the IIIrd Gen. election in Indian 1962' vol II (statistical) election Commission of India pp.80,81 and 84-85
- (ii) "Fourth Gen. election on analysis - "Ministry of Information & Broadcasting Govt. of India p.p. 198-199.
- (iii) 1972 Assembly elections "Maharashtra a Glace 1973-74" Bombay 1974 p.4
 1972 Assembly elections Also "Report on fifty general election in Indian 1971-72 -Narrative and Reflective "By election commission of India New Delhi P.165 and also "Elections under Janata rule" New Delhi by Shiv Lal P.3 "Maharashtra assembly 1978 p.3 1978 -

Table - II
Partywise strength of Lok-Sabha elections in Maharashtra 1962 to 1971.

Parties.	1962		1967		1971	
	Total Seats 44	Seats Won.	Total Seats 45	Seats won.	Total Seats 45	Seats Won.
	Cont.	% of votes.	cont.	% of votes.	cont.	% of Votes.
The Congress	44	41	45	37	42	61.30%
Swatantra	3	-	4	-	-	-
Jana Sangh	17	-	26	-	12	5.2%
The SSP.	-	-	5	2	9	2%
The CPI	-	-	2	-	-	-
Cong.O.	-	-	-	-	9	2.7%
PWP.	10	-	11	2	12	4.7%

Sources:-

- i) 1962 Results - From "Report on the IIIrd general elections in India 1962 Vol II published by Election Commission of India pages 6,7,12, and 13.
- ii) 1967 Results : "Fourth General elections on analysis " By Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India p.42 and 43.
- iii) 1971 Lok-Sabha Elections : From "Elections 1971" (Ed) by S.Sarkar Calcutta 1971 - page 129.

The Congress party further consolidated its already dominant position in Maharashtra as the state was not affected by 1969 split in the congress.

In Maharashtra out of 45 seats the congress (R) secured 42¹² (61.30% votes)¹¹ in 1971 elections against 37 seats it was in 1967 general elections. Following this massive congress victory, the party re-established its dominance in the 1972 assembly elections by extracting emotional benefits of the successful Bangladesh war of 1971 and left no room for the^{op-}position save the extra institutional Indian-style agitations and demonstrations. The congress (R) won 222¹³ seats out of 270 and secured 56.36%¹⁴ of votes while the next highest successful parties were the PWP and the Jana Sangh with 8 and 5¹⁵ seats respectively in Maharashtra assembly elections.

Thus it was clear that the congress system in the Maharashtra was firm and stable without any challenge to its state elites from other parties. On the whole, the congress regained its control over the polity.

2. Political and Economic crisis:- The second phase of the congress dominance - after the Lok-Sabha elections on closer analysis reveals that a new political process highly centralized, personalized and less institutional¹⁶ had got underway through the following ways:

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A) Reinforcing the unitary-orientations in the federal party structures.

1) Since the split in the congress in 1969 to October 1974 the party had five presidents i) C. Subramaniam Nover to Dec. 1969 ii) Jagjivam Ram December 1969 to March 1971 (iii) D. Sanjivayya March 1972 to May 1972 (iv) Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma May 1972 to October 1974 (v) A.K. Barooah October 1974 to May 1977^{17.} and the most important thing except Jagjivam Ram all of them were nominal.

B) Frequent reshuffling of ministers and portfolios just to undermine and off-balance the potentially powerful vendor Ministers¹⁸ for example Y.B. Chavan was shifted from home to finance and finance to foreign affairs within the period of 4 years.

C) Frequent changes of chief ministers of the states.¹⁹ Powerful chief ministers like B. Reddy, V.P. Naik, M.L. Shukhdia and M.M. Choudhri were removed.

Thus in her peculiar style Mrs. Gandhi consolidated her own positions. This led to concentration of power in her hand, This resulted in the pyramidal decision-making structure in party and government and laid the state chief Ministers thereby inept as time and again they were busy manoeuvring to stay in power.

Consequently political instability loomed large, added by severe economic crisis in India since Independence. It was

aggravated by (i) Bangla-Desh war in 1971 (ii) Successive droughts (iii) International energy crisis and (iv) unprecedented inflation around 30%²⁰ - an all time high and unemployment. The value of Rupee was all time low (31.20 paise)²¹ in 1975. Wealth of the country was heavily cornered by the big 20 houses like Tata (Rs. 909 crores 68 Lakhs, Birla (8.58 Crores 81 lakhs) Mafatlal (256 Crores 54 Lakhs); Sanghania (244 croress 23 Lakhs)²² etc.

Further, in put process was at its peak through extra-constitutional means such as demon strations and strikes. In 1974 alone 2510²³ strikes/Disputes with a loss of 3364360²⁴ mandays in India while in Maharashtra during 1972 to 1975 as per the statistical Abstract of Maharashtra, 1976-77, there were 3901²⁶ strikes and 15299011 mandays were lost;

Thus India was facing two fold crisis: economic and political. This failure of the congress was eventual gains. The opposition parties which seized the opportunity by galvanizing the rank and file for protests and agitations. It was under these circumstances that the students Nav-Nirman Samiti's agitation in Gujarat and later in Bihar under Jai Prakash Narain got momentum. The opposition parties supported these agitators. Some opposition parties The BKL, The Swatashtra party the S.S.P. and Utkal Congress united form the Bharatiya Lok Dal under the leadership of Chowdhary Charan Singh. This was the beginning of opposition polarization, which too supported the

aforesaid agitations. All this laid the foundation in the direction of forming the Janata party. Due to the agitation Gujarat Chief Minister Chimanbhai Patel resigned and Gujarat assembly was dissolved. The elections to Gujarat assembly were field in June 1975. In 1975 Gujarat assembly elections four opposition parties The Congress (O), Jan Sangh, BLD and Socialists. Forged an alliance called the "Janata Morcha" and succeeded in getting ²⁶₂₇ seats out of 176 as against 19 in the 1972 assembly elections. The Janata Morcha succeeded in forming the Government as it secured the support of majority. While the Congress secured ²⁸75 seats as against 140 in the 1972 assembly elections. - All this was an indication of the growing ~~po~~ unpopularity of the congress.

The situation further worsened when the Allahabad High Court on 12th June 1975 gave the Judgement that Mrs. Gandhi was guilty of violating the electoral laws in 1971 parliamentary elections at Rai-Bareilly constituency and barred her from contesting elections - for six years.

The political crisis developed was the gravest of its kind the country never faced before it was essentially a manifestation of the failure of political system owing to the highly centralized and personalized power-pattern in absence of any viable alternative. The opposition parties demand^{-ed} her resignation as Prime Minister but she did not resign. J.P. Narain who had become a rallying point for the opposition declared that we would lead a movement against her. But the political crisis was translated into the declaration of the internal emergency on the day of

26th June 1975. Mrs. Gandhi's Government arrested a large number of opposition workers and leaders and banned 26 different ^{non} political organisations, where press censorship was imposed several foreign correspondents were expelled from India - Thus democracy ceased to exist with the declaration of internal emergency.

3. Emergence of Janata Party :- The emergency rule of Mrs. Gandhi became the most unpopular rule because during that period her son Mr. Sanjay Gandhi emerged as the extra-constitutional centre of power in the Government and the party. His activities further antagonized the people. The tenure of the Lok-Sabha was extended for a year. But suddenly on 17th January 1977 Mrs. Gandhi decided to hold the general elections to elect the 6th Lok-Sabha.

This was an ideal political situation for the emergence of a viable, credible democratic national opposition party. Creation of the Janata Party by the merger of four major opposition parties (i) The Congress (O) (ii) The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (iii) The Socialist Party and the (iv) Bharatiya Lok-Dal - was in contrast with the prevalent political situation. On 23rd January 1977 just within 4 days of declaration of the Lok-Sabha elections, the party was formed. Efforts to launch a new unified opposition party were however,

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made since 1973; but they received momentum only during emergency. About 25 letters (including replies) were written in connection among charan Singh the then B.L.D. Chief. Ashok Mehta (the Cong (O) Chief), George Fernandes (President of the Socialist Party) L.K. Advani (President of the Jana Sangh) and J.P. A meeting of representatives of various political parties was held to discuss the ideology and the name of the party.

✓ All this nonetheless, the formation of Janata party was more of a preponderantly negative phenomenon as resulting out of Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarian measures such as emergency and the detention of the opposition leaders throughout the country and curbing of the press and democratic institutions. It was clear from the following:

i) The statement of Prominent Janata party leader Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee when he claimed that the Janata party was born in jail; the wisdom to unite dawned upon the opposition leaders while in jail and for this the Prime Minister deserved their gratitude" .

ii) The assessment was further confirmed by Mr. C.P. Bhambri who remarked that the "emergency phase had convinced the opposition parties that their very existence was in danger and the sixth Lok-Sabha elections of March - 1977 might be a last opportunity for them to challenge the congress party's domination over Indian politics.

Thus for the opposition, it was a question of survival. The time factor was equally important - barely a span of two months was left while many opposition leaders were still in jails (6500 in some 500 Jails) ³². Similarly in Jana Sangh working committee meeting held on 23rd January 1977, the party General Secretary Mr. Sunder Singh Bhandari pointed out that ³³ some 4000 members were still languishing in jails. Members of other parties were also not released despite relaxation in emergency on the eve of elections. Thus lack of time to ponder over the issue of unity of the opposition entailed the opposition parties for the quick-decision.

Thus the Janata Party was formed on 23rd January 1977 when its four constituents the Cong (O), The Jana Sangh, the BLD and the Socialist party decided to merge in the Janata party. Morarji Desai became the President and the B.L.D. Chief Charan Singh became the Vice-President. The party entered into fray with the support of friendly parties such as CPI (M), the Akali Dal; the P.W.P. and the D.M.K. Ideologically there were certain tension in the party as the Jana Sangh was a Hindu Nationalist Party and the B.L.D. supported the cause of peasants. The Congress (O) was a depleted party of the Congressmen.

In the first week of February Agriculture Minister Mr. Jagjivan Ram along with H.N. Bahuguna, Nandini Sathpathi and K.R. Ganesh resigned from the Congress. He formed his own party called the Congress for Democracy. With Jagjivan Ram

resignation, the scales lilted against Mrs. Gandhi and her party. The Janata leaders were riding on the crest-crave of popularity in throughout the country except the South India. Maharashtra was also under the Janata wave though comparatively in a lesser degree.

4. Sixth Lok-Sabha elections in Maharashtra and the rise of Janata Party in the State:-

1) Dynamics of Maharashtra politics:-

Maharashtra was one of the most developed states of India. Similarly it was the one of the most stable states in the country. Largely because of Y.B.Chavan's leadership who had built up the state unit of the party through 3 sectors (i) The Co-operative Sectors (2) The Panchayat Raj (iii) the State politics. He had galvanised the power structure. In such a way that more and more people were involved in it right from the grass root level to the top echelons of the State. A well-built party with loyal untenants was an instrument through which he maintained his undisputed status of leadership. Through V.P. Naik- a man from Vidarbha and also a man belonging to backward community, Y.B. Chavan shrewdly gathered support from different regions and especially Vidarbha where the movement for separate state was active. Another significant aspect of his strategy was the all round development of the state especially of W.Maharashtra from which emerged the new rural leaders working for the congress and the Government. First with the help of traditional loyalties, he maintained power; and later he replaced the traditional

loyalty to economic power which supported him. Similarly he had succeeded in evolving powerful wealthy class which needed the party support and vice-versa. Simultaneously he was enjoying the confidence of the party high command at the centre - a source of strength to Y.B.Chavan in maintaining the levers of state power in his ranks. To sum up, all these things together lent strength to sweep the polls -lok Sabha as well as Assembly almost single handedly in 62,67 and 72. Thus the Congress successively emerged victorious in all the elections while the weak opposition faced crushing defeats. The opposition failed to spread its area of influence to the rural areas and even could not spread its influence throughout the state's urban area. This is clear from the table given below.

Table No. 1A

Party strength of the Janata constituencies in Maharashtra the Assembly elections from 1962 to 1972 Vs. Congress.

Party.	1962			1967			1972.		
	Seats Con- tested.	Seats won.	% of votes.	Seats con- tested.	Seats won	% of votes.	Seats con- tested.	Seats won	% of votes.
The Cong	-	215	51.22	269	202	47.03	270	222	56.36
The Swatantra	-	-	0.44	33	-	1.12	5	-	0.09
The Jana Sangh	-	5	-	167	4	8.20	121	5	6.26
The P.S.P.	-	9	7.23	61	7	3.80	-	-	-
The S.S.P.	-	1	0.50	-	4	4.61	52	2	4.58
Cong O.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.07
C.P.I.	56	6	5.9	41	10	4.87	44	2	2.73
P.W.P.	79	15	7.46	59	19	7.8	58	7	-

Source: The elections archives 35 (July-Sept 1978 Elections 1978 - Maharashtra.

Y.B.Chavan also saw to it that no leadership could emerge in Maharashtra challenging his policies. ~~Anybody~~ who went against his interests was automatically thrown out of the levers of power by him and his men. But Mrs.Gandhi for the first time in 1975 dared Y.B.Chavan and installed his critic Mr. S.B.Chavan as C.M. of Maharashtra much to the dislike of Y.B.Chavan. With this started a new era of factionalism against the undisputed leader Y.B.Chavan, S.B. Chavan was consolidating his own position in the party. Likewise he began to curb the loyalists~~s~~ of Y.B.Chavan. In emergency when Mrs. Gandhi was at the height of power, S.B.Chavan tried to erode ^{Y.B.Chavan} support Base by dropping Vasantdada Patil from Government. Y.B.Chavan but he failed - The main reason was that Y.B.Chavan had firmly installed his men throughout the cooperatives sector, in the village panchayats, the Zilla Parishads and the educational institutes. All these were sources of support to Y.B.Chavan which resisted S.B. Chavan's anti-Y.B.Chavan policy. ³⁴ Another important reason reason for S.B.Chavan's failure was his strict implementation of 20 its economic programme, inviting the wrath of the ~~states~~ rural landlord class, especially the sugar co-operatives. Thus the state congress was marred by factionalism for the first time during S.B.Chavan's tenure as C.M. and under these circumstances, the sixth Lok-Sabha elections were declared and a new party the Janata party emerged on the state horizon as well.

(ii) Formation of Janata Party in Maharashtra :-

The Maharashtra unit of Janata Party was formed on 21st January 1977. A nine member parliamentary Board headed by Mr. S.M.Joshi was set up by the party to contest the Lok-Sabha elections in Maharashtra Mr.Charan Singh the deputy Chairman of

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the Janata party appointed Mr. Pannalal Surana as Convenor of Maharashtra state for selection of party candidates.

Background: When the elections were declared surprisingly, the political atmosphere of Maharashtra was much different than before 1) The first and foremost cause of the discontent was wrath of the victims of emergency-rule.

e.g. a) the coercive family planning programme - the targets of which jumped by 107 and 190 per cent for the years 1975-1976 and 1976-77 respectively in India while in Maharashtra 611588 during 1975-76 and 862480 during 1976-77 .

b) The political arrests under MISA of 6980 persons as per the official figures; had angered the people at large.

ii) The intelligentsia of different walks of life in an unusual way defiantly came out against the congress.

a) The Bar associations declared support to the Janata Party; besides the former chief justice Mr. M.C.Chhagla and former Justice Mr. Tarkunde alongwith justice J.C. Shah, C.R. Dalavi and Salisorabji actively campaigned for the Janata party.

b) Popular Marathi litterateur Miss Durga Bhagwati Playwright and humorist Mr. P.L. Deshpande and etc. were active for Janata victory especially in Urban area .

(iii) The internal bickerings in the congress party of Maharashtra was another important factor. The leadership of Y.B.Chavan was challenged by S.B.Chavan who was loyal to Mrs.Gandhi. He had successfully secured 24 tickets to his men as against 24 given to the Y.B.Chavan and his men.The Y.B.Chavan group was out to

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finish S.B.Chavan leadership by defeating the pro-S.B.Chavan candidates in the general elections.⁴¹

(iv) The press in the state criticized Mrs.Gandhi and supported the Janata party. News papers like the Indian Express of Bombay gave more coverage to the Janata Party. Similarly the role of Marathi news papers was no less important which too spear headed the campaign against the congress. Notable among these were the Maharashtra Times (Bombay). The Lok Satta (Bombay) The Sakal(Pune) the Tarun Bharat (Pune) and the Marathwada (Aurangbad).

(v) The Muslim League divided over the issue of support to the congress and the rebel group under Maulana Ziauddin Bukhari known as All India Muslim League was formed on 2nd February 1977⁴² which actively participated in the Janata campaign throughout Maharashtra especially in Bombay, Kokan and Marathwawada where Muslims constituted a sizable section of the populations.

Similarly the Muslim Democratic form was formed under leadership of noted Islamic scholar shams Peerzada - to give Muslim voters guidance for exercising their franchise in the Lok-Sabha elections to ensure survival of democracy"^{43.}

The greatest departure of the pre-poll political circumstances was the fact that in J.P.'s words the opposition was no more a house divided against itself. The Janata party was strong in the sense that it combined the stnews of four parties and was acquiring the strength to face the challenge posed by the congress"⁴⁴

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The traumatic experience of the jail had gifted the leaders devotion, vigour and unity as for them it was a battle of their political survival.

Issues :- " Restoration of democracy" was prominent issue at the hustings for the Janata party though it had encompassed economic programme with freedom in a phrase "Liberty with bread". The economic issue was sidetracked as was evident from J.P. Narain, Morarji Desai and other Janata Party leaders' interviews and speeches .⁴⁵ The Janata party leaders criticized Mrs. Gandhi & her son for having curtailed democracy and for the excesses and atrocities perpetrated on the people during emergency rule.

The Janata Party favoured the decentralization of power; besides believing in the revival of all the fundamental rights curtailed during the emergency. It promised to restore Gandhian values. Similarly the rural upliftment was assured.

On the other hand Mrs. Gandhi ridiculed the Janata coalition and claimed "it was democracy vs. chaos" and remarked that the Janata party was the same old mixture and that they might be united at the surface then but how long would they remain united? they were united against her but not on any positive programme .⁴⁶ Mrs. Gandhi maintained that she declared emergency to put the economy on the rails and that it was a bitter pill. During emergency the government had done well on the economic front and those gains needed to be consolidated. Thus she stressed the performance of her government achievement of democracy

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was the main issue during the Sixth Lok-Sabha elections.

Election strategy :- the Janata party in Maharashtra had no base in rural area as its constituents The Jana Sangh, The Socialists, The Cong (O) and the rebel congressmen did not have any influencing pocket. In the rural area, the PWP on the other hand ^{had} its rural bases in different parts of Maharashtra. The Janata needed its support and hence it forged an alliance with the PWP. The PWP was also a Maratha dominated left oriented political party so the task was much easy. The Janata allotted 6 seats to the P.W.P. 3 to the CPI (M), 5 to the RPI (Khobaagade) which had some influence in Vidarbha, 2 to the RPI (Kamble) and 2 to the Forward Block. The Janata Party was dependent very much on its allies in Vidarbha as its constituents did not have any base.

As far as the party tickets were concerned, candidates who were in jail were preferred similarly those who opposed Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarian rule were given tickets. While among the constituents the pockets of influence on the basis of work in the past served as criteria to give ticket to the constituents respectively.

Significantly more stress was laid on aligning the anti-congress votes in order to check division of opposition votes. Thus the Janata party succeeded in working out on alliance against congress during this elections. This was an achievement. Similarly the Janata party utilized the services of the various non-political sympathizers to win over the masses. Thus it succeeded in creating an atmosphere through rallies against the ruling congress especially in Urban areas.

Election results and Analysis:- In Maharashtra, 148 seats, 211 candidates were in the fray and out of 28,844,061 electorate 17,414,823 (60.38%) 51 voters had casted their votes. The congress secured 7,942,267 (47.02%) votes and the Janata Party secured 5,316,039 (31.39%) votes (please see table No.2) The Janata Party got 28 seats while the congress got 20. Thus the congress lost its majority in the state. This was a severe blow to the congress party, the strongest party in the state having a well-knit organization spread throughout the social strata of the society.

The election results showed the electoral map of the state. Whereas Bombay and Kokan and Marathwada were dominated by the Janata Party, Vidarbha was dominated by the congress. Maharashtra was dominated by the Janata but the sugar co-operative areas in Western Maharashtra returned the congress candidate in some urban areas.

In Bombay and Kokan the congress drew a blank. In Marathwada, it could get just one seat that too out of a Taluka from Solapur District. The regions Marathwada and Kokan were known for their backwardness while Bombay was an urban area. In Vidarbha, out of 10 seat contest the congress got 8 seats and in Western Maharashtra out of 12, the congress got 10 seats. Western Maharashtra was the stronghold of the Janata Party and the sugar co-operatives had supported the congress.

Table - I comparative strength of Janata party and the congress.

Statement showing the Regionwise results of the Sixth Lok-Sabha elections in Maharashtra.

Sr. No.	Regions	The Janata Party		The Congress.		% of votes polled.	% of seats won.	% of votes polled.	% of seats won.	% of votes polled.	% of seats won.
		Total seats	Seats contended.	Total seats	Seats contended.						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	11
1	Bombay	6	5	5	83.33%	49.1%	6	-	-	-	35.96%
2	Kokan	5	3	3	60%	34.79%	5	-	-	-	38.31%
3	Khandesh	6	6	4	66.66%	45.48%	6	2	33.37	48.85%	
4	Marathwada	8	3	3	37.5%	18.98%	8	1	12.5%	40.78%	
5	Western Maharashtra	12	8	2	16.66%	27.69%	12	9	75%	55.42%	
6	Vadarbha	11	4	2	42.81%	15.46%	10	8	80%	42.86%	
	Total	48	29	19	39.58%	31.39%	47	20	41.66%	47.02%	

Source: "The Vth General election to the House of people in India 1977" -Vol.II (Statistical) - By Election Commission of India, New Delhi PP-314, 315, 316 and 317.

apart, the Zilla Parishad, the land development banks and the educational institutions were firmly controlled by the congress. Similarly it was clear that Western Maharashtra was homeland of Y.B. Chavan and as a prosperous region was comparatively more loyal to Y.B. Chavan who was still enjoying their support. Majority of the congress candidates in the region were the supporters of Y.B. Chavan and only four leaders supported rival leader S.B. Chavan. This was the reason why the congress won comfortably in Western Maharashtra while it lost 3 seats mainly in the urban constituencies of Pune, Kolhapur, and Baramati. In Vidharbha the congress could win firstly because it did not experience the heavy thrust of powerful Janata party campaign carried out by political and non-political people working with zeal and devotion with a clear object of bringing back democracy. Secondly

the family planning excesses were not as severe as in Maharashtra-Kokan. Thirdly the Janata and allies did not have any worthwhile base in Vidarbha. Marathwada where family planning were also a problem for congress and the backwardness of Marathwada was no less important -thus it resented the congress. Another important reason of congress defeat was the factional politics within the congress. The Y.B. Chavan group was inimical to S.B. Chavan and hence all the S.B. Chavan men were defeated as a measure to cut S.B. Chavan to size. This happened in Kokan as well.

Out of 19 seats the Janata party secured, 12 seats came from Urban constituencies. While in remaining 7 urban constituencies 4 were the strong-pockets of congress viz.

(1) Sangli (2) Satara (3) Akola and (4) Amravati while in 3 Urban constituencies i.e. (i) Solapur (ii) Osmanabad and (iii) Ahmed Nagar, the congress won just because of the backward communities and minorities votes.⁴⁹ Thus it was clear that the urban voters by and large rejected the congress.

In rural constituencies, the Janata partially succeeded with 6 seats while the congress got 13 seats in rural Maharashtra. These constituencies were either from Vidarbha or Western Maharashtra. This could be considered partly as lack of political education among the rural voters and partly due to the poor campaigning and failure to muster support from the people by Janata and its allies.

The traditional congress voters were divided in this election. While the Muslims in Marathwada and Bombay Division voted to the Janata, the Vidarbha and Western Maharashtra Muslims voted to the congress. This was because of the active support extended to the Janata by Muslims league - rebel group, and the active support by Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim Democratic Forum to the Janata. This was because of the loss of faithⁱⁿ the congress party they used to vote in previous elections. It was a voice of dissent as well.

The labours stood firmly behind the Janata party as they had to suffer in emergency. According to official figures from July 1975 to June 1976, 120,000 labourers were expelled and 70000 were forced to work on⁵⁰ shift basis like the temporary ones.

Besides they were suppressed in different ways. Similarly, the Janata party had socialist party in its fold who was the champion of labour cause.

On the whole, what was evident from the election results was, the emergence of new trends. The state was undergoing a new political change. The emergence of Janata party, the defeat of congress in the state was in fact a challenge to the ruling elites posed by the new forces. It was the defeat of the rural capitalists who were maintaining the levers of power through congress. It was also evident that elections could be won despite the sugar lobbies active support to the congress. The electoral divisions of Maharashtra was the voice of revolt against the Western Maharashtra a deominated congress. The regions comparatively backward, almost defeated congress altogether and showed their disappointment against the ruling elites.

Personally it was a defeat of Y.B.Chavan as well his unchallenged and undisputed leadership was now challenged by the Janata party. Similarly one could see the prospects of increased political competitiveness in the state deplacng the hitherto pattern of one party dominance. Consequently, the rise of Jana^{-ta} in the state was a disturbing factor to the rural land lords and sugar barons whose hold became rather loose and propsects of Janata Party unseating them from levers of power in the near future forced them to leave the congress party for greener pastures.

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Among 19 Janata party candidates, one belonged to the RPI (Kamble), 6 belonging to erstwhile Jana Sangh, 5 to the former socialist party; 3 of the former congress (O) and one rebel Congressman - 2 candidates were without any party affiliation.⁵¹

Professionally 7 Janata MPs were peasants; 5 advocates; one Businessman while the remaining were full time political activists.⁵²

Similarly the Janata Party was not dominated by the Marathas as only 5 Marathas out of 19 Janata candidates were elected while 5 Brahmins were elected on Janata tickets. Out of remaining 9 Janata candidates, 2-Gujarat Marwari, 1 Sindhi 1 Rajput 1 Neo Buddhist and 3 SC and ST candidates were elected.⁵³

Thus the social background of the major party, emerged in the Lok-Sabha elections in Maharashtra showed that the Maratha dominance was checked and a new social alliance was emerging to challenge the rural elites of the state- This was essentially a new trend in Maharashtra politics.

To sum up, the rise of the Janata party at centre was the result of emergency and the ~~pre~~ forces that consolidated position of the party at centre were at work in Maharashtra. It can be said that Maharashtra walways got

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influenced by national politics. Apart from this crucial factor, there were many factors that caused the defeat to the congress in the state. Such as resentment of the people from backward areas of the state Muslim votes voted for Janata, rivalry between Y.B.Chavan and S.B.Chavan and emergency feelings of the urban voters etc.

Now the Janata party had to consolidate its gains and uproot the congress party from its strongholds to capture power in the ensuing assmebly elections.

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